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DEVELOPMENTS IN LATIN AMERICAN NARCOTICS CONTROL, NOVEMBER 1985

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 12, 1985

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DEVELOPMENTS IN LATIN AMERICAN NARCOTICS CONTROL, NOVEMBER 1985

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1985

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The task force met, at 1:50 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Larry Smith (chairman of the task force) presiding.

Mr. SMITH. The task force will come to order.

We meet today to review recent developments in narcotics control in Latin America, particularly in Colombia and Peru.

In the past few months, there have been some dramatic events in this region. Some have been quite encouraging. New civilian governments have taken power in Peru and Bolivia. Peru has undertaken a vigorous interdiction campaign. Venezuela has taken the lead in proposing regional narcotics control initiatives. Numerous bilateral agreements have been signed by countries in the region. Colombia has proceeded with its eradication program.

However, there have been some discouraging trends as well. Bolivia has still failed to begin an eradication program and the eradication effort in Peru is lagging. Venezuela appears to be emerging as a transshipment point. And the recent terrorist attack by the M-19 in Colombia has troubling overtones of narcoterrorism.

So, we want to examine all these trends, as well as to discuss the impact of the antinarcotics legislation recently enacted in the foreign aid bill.

Our two witnesses today are again with us, the Honorable Jon R. Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, and Mr. David C. Westrate, Assistant Administrator for Operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration. We will have a number of questions for you, so you may want to summarize your statements.

I think we will proceed first with Mr. Thomas. We have your statement, Mr. Thomas, it will be made part of the record, and you may proceed accordingly.

Before you begin, just let me say that since we have had a meeting of this task force, a number of the members of this task force and of the Congress have been to the United Nations. Congressman Rangel, Congressman Mica, Congressman Gilman, and myself, all hosted a luncheon—I believe you are aware—at which approximately 20 of the nations around the world that either are directly

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or indirectly involved regionally with narcotics were present. At my table alone was Venezuela, Belize, Bahamas, Colombia, and Peru. We also had Thailand, Burma, and a number of other countries, from South America, Central America, and the like—Brazil, Argentina, and so on, Mexico, and some European countries.

We were very gratified at the feeling that the United Nations in general of those people—and many were Ambassadors, not just low level consular staff.

I was rather impressed by two things: First of all, the dedication that most of these people had to finally once and for all really do something on a regional and worldwide basis about the drug problem.

The second thing I was impressed with was whether they had anything to say or not, they were going to say something. I guess that's just the United Nations in them coming out. So, we had a few speeches which, frankly, didn't really mean anything, but that's all right, given the setting, I suppose that's appropriate. But it really was fascinating to see for the first time people saying things that they have never said before on behalf of their own countries. I was very gratified as to what I heard.

The only fly in the ointment was the Ambassador from Mexico, who made the same old statement that we were hearing in the 1970's—if it wasn't for the demand in the United States, there wouldn't be any drug problem anywhere in the whole world. This was just after a speech that I had just given a few minutes earlier, where I indicated that in France and in England, they are up to their eyeballs in cocaine, much of which has been diverted from the shores of the United States. It has been imported into those countries through transshipping in Argentina, to Spain and from there into the European Common Market. But the Mexican again insisted that if it wasn't for our market there would hardly be any growing.

Beyond that, however, we heard some enormously helpful, constructive, legitimately concerned speeches. I hope that we are, in fact, trying to foster the kind of cooperation which we have talked about here for years within that framework.

I will say this, Mr. Thomas, directly to you. I recently wrote a letter to the Secretary, concerning one of the things that was probably the most glaring deficiency that those of us at the United Nations felt. One of the most glaring facts that was elicited at a meeting we had just before the luncheon with our own delegation and the U.S. Mission people, who were very helpful, was that there was no mention in the speeches given by the Secretary of State or the President before the U.N. General Assembly, of the narcotics issue. It is extremely difficult for us to understand the lack of any mention. Numerous other countries made mention of the growing drug problem.

We ascribed that to an oversight. We think that the Secretary—I know you are, and I believe the Secretary and the whole State Department, is extremely concerned about the drug problem, and is eliciting the kind of bilateral and regional cooperation which we need.

We just went into another operation, which is being announced today—which was in the paper about 2 weeks—Hat Trick 2, which

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is going to require, and is getting, enormous amounts of bilateral and regional cooperation.

We can only hope that at any time that the Secretary has the occasion to raise the issue at an international forum like the 40th anniversary of the General Assembly, that the Secretary would take every opportunity to do so.

I won't get into why it wasn't in there. There are some conflicting stories about that. But the reality is, we feel that it would have been extremely appropriate to do so. My own feeling is, had you had the final say, it would have been in there.

In any event, I just thought I would let you know that our visit at the United Nations and our subsequent press conference, I thought, were very, very successful in highlighting the problem. I think there is much more of an awareness now with those people that we have been trying to make aware of this problem then there has been before, and I hope that we will begin building on that.

So, Mr. Thomas, with that, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JON R. THOMAS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, share your growing optimism with regards to the United Nations, also understanding its limitations as a body.

I will be addressing the United Nations this Thursday morning, delivering a narcotics speech as to the many initiatives that we see now in the United Nations. We are very encouraged about it, particularly the advancement of a new International Convention Against Narcotics Trafficking, which has very wide appeal, and the Secretary General's personal leadership, and his call for a world conference in 1987.

I would say that with regards to Secretary Shultz and his statement, I was very pleased that he was very active privately on the margins of the U.N.'s 40th anniversary. It was through his good efforts, as well as some other governments' good efforts, that we now will have the issue of narcotics trafficking as a formal agenda item on the next economic summit meeting which will be held in Japan. It was during his visit to New York in preparation for the beginning of the U.N. General Assembly that those discussions took place, and he was a very strong advocate for the necessity, the requirement, that this issue be elevated to that status. I think that will be a very beneficial development for all of us, and particularly our programs overseas.

I would like to make a summary statement from my remarks which will take a few moments, with your permission, sir.

This afternoon I would like to talk about some new opportunities in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and also to emphasize our need to capitalize on some of the opportunities we see around the world.

Only two countries were eradicating narcotics crops in 1981. In the 1985–86 crop cycles, at least 14 countries are eradicating narcotics crops. The marijuana eradication programs in Colombia and Jamaica have intensified. New spraying projects have been undertak-

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en in Belize and Panama. Colombia is preparing for a significant test of methods to spray coca. Burma and Thailand have sharply upgraded their opium poppy eradication programs, and Pakistan continues to expand the scope of its ban on poppy production.

We have opportunities also to contain the spread of narcotics cultivation through new initiatives in Brazil and Ecuador. New governments are giving strong impetus to narcotics control in Peru and Bolivia.

I want to note the meeting held in Quito last month by our Chiefs of Mission to Andean countries. This was a meeting that I attended along with Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs.

Undeniably, we face complex, often frustrating challenges in the Andean region. But I must say, I was very encouraged by the "can do" attitudes our Ambassadors displayed at that meeting with regards to narcotics control objectives.

COLOMBIA

The historical notable marijuana eradication campaign; the cross-border enforcement projects with Peru and Ecuador; the interactions with Brazil, Panama, and Venezuela; the developing interregional narcotics enforcement communications network, which is centered in Bogota; and the continuing search for an effective method of eradicating coca, without any doubt make Colombia not only the leader in South American narcotics control activities, but one of the very real bright spots in the expanded international effort of the 1980's.

The Colombian eradication campaign continues to set marks by which other efforts will be compared. Aerial surveys show that marijuana cultivation in the principal northern growing region declined 85 percent from 1983 to 1985.

We are consulting with Colombian agencies on how we might enhance their interdiction capabilities to compound the pressure on traffickers. Its actions with its neighbors to curb trafficking in coca products and interdiction campaign are quite encouraging.

There are still some dark spots on this otherwise bright Colombian picture. Colombia remains the principal refining source of cocaine. Intimidation, including the murder of judges, continues to challenge the Colombian system of justice, and arrests and conviction rates can be improved.

There is evidence that Colombian traffickers are heavily involved in criminal activities in many other countries. We, of course, are concerned about the possibility that marijuana production can increase in other sites in Colombia.

PERU

In Peru, President Alan Garcia has been quite adamant about the need to root out and destroy, using his words, narcotics trafficking. But on Peru, I would like to dispense with one nonissue. Erroneous press reports to the contrary, the Department has not linked narcotics control assistance to Peru's performance on other bilateral issues.

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We have agreements providing more than $30 million in narcotics-related assistance, which we continue to expend on the current program, and in accord with current statutes, are awaiting Peru's plan for comprehensive coca control programs. We have long sought an understanding with Peru on expansion of the current eradication program now centered in the Upper Huallaga Valley to other growing regions. We are prepared to assist that expansion.

Peru has increased the effectiveness of both the eradication and enforcement programs. The Peruvians are planning an intensified eradication campaign during November and December, and say that it is possible they will reach the 1985 goal of 6,000 hectares.

More than 200 police officials have been dismissed in Peru's housecleaning operation.

However, the job of curtailing cultivation of coca leaf and stopping production of cocaine in Peru is far from complete, and the evidence is that counter efforts may be increasing.

BOLIVIA

Bolivia remains our greatest current challenge, not only because of the shear enormity of the coca cultivation but because of the long-term difficulty in getting an eradication program started. We are still cautious in our appraisal but positive steps are being taken to implement the decree promulgated last July establishing the needed legal basis for undertaking a coca control program.

A new proposal would create a Ministry of Narcotics Affairs which would exercise full authority over the police and all other agencies concerned with narcotics. The new government is not only quite sensitive to the impact that narcotics production has on decisions by the United States to provide economic and other assistance, but is keenly aware of the negative effects on its own society.

The Interior Ministry has held a series of promising talks with campesino leaders from the Chapare region, to discuss the voluntary and involuntary phases of the proposed eradication operation, which could start next month in the Chapare and Yapacani areas.

We will advise the Foreign Affairs Committee the day the eradication actually begins.

ECUADOR

Ecuador has become a source country and the objective we share with the Febres-Cordero government is to contain production and trafficking at its current relatively low level, and then eliminate it.

I met last month with national leaders of Ecuador and we are actively considering requests from the Embassy to expand sharply our narcotics assistance program in that country.

BELIZE

The Government of Belize undertook a test spraying program using glyphosate, which ended November 1. This 4-day program caused the eradication of an estimated 1,270 acres of marijuana on 741 cultivation sites in the northern area, where an estimated 70 percent of the crop is grown. The preliminary assessment is that

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the acreage eradicated constituted the bulk of marijuana cultivation in the area.

PANAMA

We recently participated wilth Panamanian officials in overflights of prospective marijuana cultivation zones last August, and found that in sharp contrast to the less than 100 hectares under cultivation reported in 1984, this year's harvest could be 500 to 600 hectares, or even more.

We immediately consulted on an aerial eradication operation. In October, Panama began herbicidal eradication of this unexpectedly large crop, and reportedly eradicated more than 200 of an estimated 500 to 600 hectares under cultivation.

SUMMARY

In closing, I want to comment briefly on the new climate in which we are working at the international level. Perhaps the most profound change has been the realization by other governments that drug trafficking is a threat to their national security and their economic and social well-being. This realization of national risk is spurring efforts for more cooperative bilateral and multilateral enforcement and demand reduction programs.

We have a long way to go before we reach the ultimate benefits inherent in these initiatives, but the great promise for our future is that the affected members of the world community are in fact beginning to act in concert.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Thomas.

[Mr. Thomas' prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JON R. THOMAS, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MR. CHAIRMAN:

The Committee has asked my Bureau to provide testimony on progress in narcotics control in the Andean countries, with an emphasis on Colombian eradication and interdiction efforts, extradition, and the connection between drug traffickers and guerrilla/terrorist groups. Your Task Force has also asked that we expand this testimony to update the Committee on anti-narcotics efforts in Belize. I would like to add Panama to the scope of this hearing, and update you on recent developments in that country, which has also been of interest to the Task Force.

As part of my submitted testimony, I am including the Colombian section of the Mid-Year Update to our International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. That report contains not only our country-by-country assessments, as of August 1, but also reports on the critical success of our diplomatic initiatives, and I commend it to the Committee's consideration.

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Colombia

Colombia is increasingly successful in its narcotics control efforts. Certainly the effective and comprehensive marijuana eradication campaign, the cross-border enforcement projects with Peru and Ecuador, the inter-actions with Brazil, Panama and Venezuela, the developing intra-regional narcotics enforcement communications network which is centered in Colombia, and the continuing search for an effective, comprehensive method of eradicating coca make Colombia not only the leader in South American narcotics control activities but one of the very real bright spots in the expanded international effort of the 1980's.

During my visit to Colombia the week of November 14, we reported to President Betancur the results of the aerial survey of marijuana cultivation which we assisted the Colombian National Police in conducting in July. The analysis shows that, compared to an estimated 8,500 hectares under cultivation in the same cycle in 1983, only 1,300 hectares were under cultivation in the principal northern growing region in 1985, a decline of 85 percent.

As Colombia strives toward its goal of eliminating the great majority of the 1985 crop, the eradication campaign continues to set marks by which other efforts will be compared. The Special Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Colombian National Police set all-time records in July and August,

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including spraying in the principal Santa Marta growing area and also in other areas where traffickers have attempted to increase cultivation. Using surveys, we will assist the Colombians next spring in assessing the degree to which cultivation may have spread to the Gulf of Uraba, as well as Bolivar Department, and other areas.

Colombia remains the principal refining source for cocaine, and its actions with its neighbors to curb trafficking in coca products and precursor chemicals are quite encouraging, as are the tests Colombia continues to conduct with herbicides which might permit aerial eradication of the coca bush, which is so frustratingly difficult to remove by manual labor.

We are consulting closely with Colombian agencies, as well as other Departments in our government, on how we might enhance Colombian interdiction capabilities, to compound the pressure on trafficking organizations. We are also sensitive to trafficker efforts to relocate in new growing sites for marijuana and coca and new refinery locations for cocaine, which is why we put so much emphasis on control programs in Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Belize and elsewhere.

In our recent communications with the Congress, we have emphasized the importance of achieving our parallel diplomatic goal of increasing the internationalization of this problem. One part of that effort has been to encourage and logistically support regional enforcement actions. The numerous enforcement efforts by Colombia have been particularly encouraging.

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Within its own territory, the National Police has intensified sweep operations, targetting traffickers, their boats and aircraft, as well as laboratory sites, which have been destroyed along with numerous landing fields. We are enhancing that capability through the provision of additional aircraft. Colombia has extradited seven persons to the United States, a major demonstration of its commitment to narcotics control under the Betancur Administration.

And, Colombia is developing a significant role as a leader in regional narcotics control initiatives. The multi-nation radio network among South American enforcement agencies will soon be operational. Colombia has signed an extradition agreement with Venezuela; a joint coca eradication campaign has been conducted with Ecuador; and, Colombia and Peru have engaged quite successfully in a cross-border operation against cocaine traffickers.

While discussing regional initiatives, I want to note the meeting held in Quito last month by our Chiefs of Mission to Andean countries. Assistant Secretary Abrams and I, and other Washington-based officials, value such opportunities for concentrated discussion on regional and country issues, especially issues like narcotics which have such significant cross-border implications. Our Ambassadors confirm that the spirit of regional cooperation which last year prompted Latin American heads of government to issue the Declaration of Quito,

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and to support the Latin initiative for a new international convention on drug trafficking, continues to be reflected in cooperative enforcement programs such as those undertaken by several countries with Colombia. Undeniably, we face complex, often frustrating challenges in the Andean region, but I must say I was encouraged by the "can do" attitudes our Ambassadors displayed at this meeting.

There are still some dark spots on this otherwise bright Colombian picture. Intimidation, including the murder of judges, continues to challenge the Colombian system of justice, and arrest and conviction rates can be improved. Our concerns about this situation are compounded by evidence that Colombian traffickers are heavily involved in criminal activities in many other countries, actions that range from sponsoring new growing fields to controlling shipments of chemicals to laundering of the vast illicit profits from narcotics trafficking.

The readiness of Colombian traffickers, as well as insurgents with links to traffickers, and political terrorists in general, to resort to violence shocks even veteran observers of Latin American narcotics crime. In April, 1984, assassins paid by major traffickers killed the Minister of Justice, Lara Bonilla. Now, this past week, M-19 guerillas stormed the Palace of Justice. Thankfully, on both occasions, the Betancur Government has refused to be intimidated, and has responded strongly.

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The brutal attack by the M-19 on the Palace of Justice on November 6-7 resulted in the death of the President of the Supreme Court and other Justices of that Court. We join the government and people of Colombia in shock and outrage at this despicable act. Among the casualties of the case were court records on extradition cases. Fortunately, the records can -- and will -- be replaced. Sadly, the lives of innocent officials cannot. We are confident that the Government of Colombia will continue its work on the extradition process as the judicial system resumes normal operations.

In sum, the Colombian record of the past two years is very encouraging, and deserving of our congratulations. Moreover, the anti-narcotics institutions in Colombia are deeply rooted and we expect will be continued after next year's change in government.

Peru

Our Ambassador to Peru, David Jordan, met in September with you, Mr. Chairman (Rep. Smith) and Congressman Gilman (ranking minority member) and I am informed that you share our initial optimism over the early actions and statements of the Garcia Administration, especially the new president's actions to thwart corruption by cleaning house and authorizing Peru's commitment to Operation Condor.

There are many bilateral issues for resolution with President Alan Garcia, who took office in July, some of which

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Ambassador Jordan discussed with you, but, in the narcotics sector, the President has been quite adamant about the need to "root out and destroy" narcotics trafficking in Peru.

At the outset, let me dispense with one non-issue. Erroneous press reports to the contrary, the Department has not linked narcotics control assistance to Peru's performance or behavior on other bilateral issues. As this Task Force knows full well, the linkage runs the other direction: the provision of economic and other assistance is linked to performance on narcotics control. We have agreements providing more than $30 million in narcotics related assistance, which we continue to expend on the current program, and, in accord with current statutes, are awaiting Peru's plan for comprehensive coca control programs. We have long sought an understanding with Peru on expansion of the current eradication program, now centered in the Upper Huallaga Valley, to other growing regions. We are prepared to assist that expansion.

Peru has increased the effectiveness of both eradication and enforcement programs. The latest cables from Lima report that 2,576 hectares of coca had been eradicated through the end of September. The eradication program, which has grown from 200 to more than 970 workers, is moving into the Uchiza area, where the flat terrain should permit a faster pace. Using aerial photography provided by INM for planning, the Peruvians are planning an intensified eradication campaign during

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ovember and December, and say that it is possible they will each the 1985 goal of 6,000 hectares.

In Peru's housecleaning operation, Interior Minister alinas has dismissed 56 generals and 131 colonels from the nvestigations Police and the Civil Guard, as well as 40 other olice officials, with promises of more dismissals.

The latest reports we have on Operation Condor, a joint effort by the Peruvian and Colombian governments, with U.S. ssistance, are that six cocaine laboratory complexes have been eized and destroyed; 11 airstrips have been located, ncluding one paved landing field over 3,000 feet in length, nd 8 of these airstrips have been destroyed. The operation eized 1,530 kilos of cocaine paste and base, as well as 4,980 allons of precursor chemicals, and also seized seven aircraft. n undetermined amount of potassium permanganate, 1,000 gallons diesel fuel and a quantity of generators and other equipment ere also seized.

These are impressive statistics, but, the job of rtailing cultivation of coca leaf and stopping production of ocaine in Peru is far from complete, and the evidence is that ounter-efforts may be increasing.

A Guardia Civil trooper was murdered on September 18 while otecting eradication workers near Santa Lucia. The attackers outed pro-terrorist slogans, and left a small flag with mmer and sickle near the body, but, given past experience, we

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don't know whether the attackers were really terrorists or narcotics traffickers who have shown no restraint in using terrorist-style violence.

Protection measures for eradication workers will be increased still further as the government pursues its eradication goal. Because eradication efforts have resulted in intimidation efforts directed against the United States, we are also having to increase security for U.S. personnel in Lima and in the field.

Bolivia

Bolivia remains our greatest current challenge, not only because of the sheer enormity of the coca cultivation, which was estimated at 30,000 to 45,000 hectares in 1984, but because of the long-term difficulty in getting an eradication program started. There have been several occasions since August 1983, when the United States signed an eradication agreement with Bolivia, when the political rhetoric was positive.

We are still cautious in our appraisal but I must note we are encouraged today because the new government of President Paz Estenssoro has begun to match the rhetoric of his predecessors with strong actions.

Positive steps are being taken to implement the decree promulgated last July which at last establishes the needed legal basis for undertaking a coca control program, including designation of zones where licit production will be licensed

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and thereby declaring all other production to be illegal and subject to eradication. On October 28, a new proposal for a comprehensive law on narcotics was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies. The proposed law would create a new Ministry of Narcotics Affairs which would exercise full authority over the police and all other agencies concerned with narcotics. The proposed law would also strengthen the existing decree: it would make judicial review of all narcotics cases mandatory, and it would tighten procedures while strengthening penalties.

Importantly, the dialogue has also changed; the new Government is not only quite sensitive to the impact that narcotics production has on decisions by the United States to provide economic and other assistance, but is keenly aware of the negative effects on its own society.

The Interior Ministry has held a series of promising talks with campesino leaders from the Chapare region, to discuss the voluntary and involuntary phases of the proposed eradication operation, which could start this month in the Chapare and Yapacani areas.

We will advise the Foreign Affairs Committee the day that eradiction actually begins.

The Bolivians have also stepped up enforcement activities. On October 25, members of the UMOPAR detachment conducted an operation near Cochabamba which resulted in the destruction of five cocaine laboratories. Another five laboratories were destroyed two days later.

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Ecuador

I want to talk about the new opportunities in Ecuador, but also to use Ecuador to highlight our institutional concern. As I have said on other occasions, only two countries were eradicating narcotics crops in 1981, and in the 1985-86 crop cycles, at least 14 countries are undertaking eradication programs. (Mexico, Belize, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Jamaica, Thailand, Burma and Pakistan) In just the past few months, the marijuana eradication programs in Colombia and Jamaica have intensified; new spraying projects have been undertaken in Belize and Panama; Colombia is preparing for a significant test of methods to spray coca; Burma and Thailand have sharply upgraded their opium poppy eradication programs and Pakistan continues to expand the scope of its ban on poppy production. We have opportunities to contain the spread of narcotics cultivation in South America through new initiatives in Brazil and Ecuador. New governments are giving strong impetus to narcotics control in Peru and Bolivia.

Ecuador is a good example of the dynamics of the narcotics trade. For many years, Ecuador, sited between the growing fields of Peru and the laboratories of Colombia, was a transit country. Now, it has become a source country, and the objective we share with the Febres-Cordero government, which has been especially agressive on the narcotics issue since

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taking office in 1984, is to contain that production and trafficking at its current, relatively low level and then eliminate it.

The specific objectives are to eradicate the estimated 3,000 hectares of coca under cultivation, and to stop the burgeoning traffic in precursor chemicals, which rose to 3,000 to 5,000 metric tons in 1984-85, compared to 10-20 tons in the 1980-83 period. The presence of these chemicals confirms earlier reports that traffickers were attempting to establish a cocaine refining capability in Ecuador; the estimate is that perhaps a dozen shipments of 500 to 1000 kilograms of cocaine were shipped to the United States from Ecuador labs in 1984.

I met last month with national leaders of Ecuador and we are actively considering requests from the Embassy to expand sharply our narcotics assistance program in Ecuador. We want to enhance aerial surveillance capabilities as well as eradication resources.

Belize

At the Task Force's hearing June 27, I expressed my strong hope that the new government of Prime Minister Esquivel would resume aerial herbicidal eradication of the expanding marijuana crop in Belize. In that regard, your (Chairman Smith) concerns were communicated to Prime Minister Esquivel in your letter of July 25.

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We are very pleased to report that the Government of Belize undertook a test spraying program, using glyphosate, which ended November 1. This four-day program caused the eradication of an estimated 1,270 acres of marijuana on 741 cultivation sites in the northern area. This area is the primary marijuana producing zone, where an estimated 70 percent of the crop is grown. The preliminary assessment is that the acreage eradicated constituted the bulk of marijuana cultivation in the area.

Given the success of this Belizean effort, we are encouraged by the indications that the Government is considering a further eradication campaign in January, depending on its analysis of the effects of the chemical on the growing areas.

Panama

In August, staff in my Bureau participated with Panamanian officials in overflights of prospective marijuana cultivation zones and found that, in sharp contrast to the less than 100 hectares under cultivation reported in 1984, this year's harvest could be 500 to 600 hectares or even more, unless quick action were taken. We immediately consulted with the Panamanians on an aerial herbicidal eradication program, and offered to provide a spray aircraft and technical assistance. Panama was quick to accept this offer and extend its full cooperation. In October, Panama began herbicidal eradication

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of this unexpectedly large crop, and reportedly eradicated more than 200 of an estimated 500-600 hectares under cultivation.

This action reconfirms our belief in crop control through aerial eradication, and in the use of the Thrush aircraft which we have now deployed to several countries.

Conclusion

This concludes my prepared remarks on Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Belize and Panama, Mr. Chairman. I understand that the Task Force may also ask questions about the Mid-Year Report which you and your staff have been reviewing these past few weeks. Given the number of events which are occurring, including not just a few on the international front, it is appropriate that we take this opportunity to update the Committee on the broad spectrum of country and global issues.

I particularly want to focus on one element -- the new climate in which we are working at the international level. I have seen many changes in my going on four years in INM and perhaps the most profound has been the realization by other governments that drug trafficking is a threat to their national security and their economic and social well-being. Some countries whose leaders once thought they were immune are now suffering narcotics epidemics. This realization of national risk is spurring efforts for more cooperative bilateral and multilateral enforcement and demand reduction programs.

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I cannot over-emphasize the importance of having reached this concurrence of world opinion, this community of interest which I believe has great potential for progress by source country governments.

We have a long way to go before we reach the benefits inherent in these initiatives, but, the great promise for our future is that the affected members of the world community are beginning to act in concert.

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EXCERPT FROM MID-YEAR UPDATE
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT
August 1, 1985

Summary

Colombia continued to press its anti-narcotic effort in ne first half of this year. 1985 began auspiciously with the xtradition to the U.S. of the first four Colombians pursuant o the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty. Two more persons ere extradited by mid-year, for a total of five Colombians and ne German national, and the first American was extradited to olombia in June. The lower level of aerial marijuana radication in the first few months of 1985 (compared to 1984) s attributable to the seasonal low in cultivations and the ffectiveness of the spray program in 1984. The National olice sprayed 3,414 hectares by the end of 1984 and conducted eriodic aerial patrols (touching down when growers were seen) o discourage new planting. By April it was apparent that this einforced tactic was causing large numbers of growers to bandon cannabis cultivation; extensive reconnaissance of the ain growing areas in March and July revealed marked reductions n areas cultivated and an absence of field workers. By June he tempo of spraying increased as the rainy season progressed nd spray records were set, bringing the six-month total to ,884 hectares. By July 31, 1985, nearly 3,000 hectares had een sprayed.

Meanwhile, the National Police (NP) also gave high riorities to testing herbicides on coca and conducting ask-force raids on cocaine labs, illicit airstrips and other rug transit sites and curbing precursor chemical movement.

In February, the Ministry of Defense launched a large, ombined-forces sweep of Northern drug-producing and rafficking departments, targeting traffickers, their roperties, known trafficking boats and aircraft, labs and irstrips. The new tactic of airstrip denial by cratering scores were destroyed) emerged in the sweep. This tactic also as used in destroying 22 airstrips in the Amazon area by May.

Mid-year totals of interdiction statistics show that new NM-provided program resources were rapidly and effectively eployed:

> 706.3 mt. of processed marijuana; 959.5 mt of loose cannabis plants; 5.1 mt of cocaine; 365 cocaine labs destroyed; and 1,004 arrests.

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Enforcement agencies increased efforts to arrest major traffickers, resulting in the capture of the notorious Juan Ramon Matta Ballesteros and a near-miss on Carlos Lehder. In other significant developments, four of seven new, GOC-purchased helicopters were incorporated in the National Police air-wing; eleven new helicopter pilots graduated and 14 officer-trainees entered training in the INM-supported training program. Other pilots, as well as technicians, received training at the Bell factory. The anti-narcotics police air wing progressed to self-sufficiency in anticipation of the personnel support services from a private contractor in August 1985.

Colombia was active also in legal reform and international control efforts. The Chamber of Deputies approved a strong, new drug control bill, and the Ministry of Justice and the National Police met with neighboring and other hemisphere countries to plan bilateral and multilateral controls. Three new drug demand reduction and control agreements were signed with the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, committing U.S. $4.6 million to these activities. Several private demand reduction organizations participated in exchange visits, and the Government of Colombia (GOC) signed a demand reduction project agreement with the U.S.

2. Drug Production Assessment for 1985

A) Marijuana

Increased spray eradication and stepped-up reconnaissance and crop survey activity this year will permit making better estimates of area cultivation and production. Enough is known now to confirm that projections made in the 1985 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) on potential reductions will be met and possibly exceeded. Hectarage cultivated may be less than the 8,000 estimated, because the incidence of abandonment of cannabis growing is higher than expected -- due both to heavy spraying in 1984 and to the NP tactic of regular overflights of fields and landings to discourage growers. A large proportion of fields sprayed to date in 1985 have been sparse stands of volunteer plants, which appear to have sprouted from fallen seeds, rather than prepared cultivations. A sharp upswing in spraying occurring in June and July would, if sustained, result in exceeding the 6,000 hectare eradication target. Seizures are already well over half of the year's target. A sample photographic crop survey at mid-year will permit making a crop estimate with a higher degree of validity.

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B) Coca

Mid-year projections of coca cultivation and cocaine production are less certain. The reduced estimate of area cultivated in 1985 is warranted in view of the general down-trend due to the lesser profitability of Colombia-grown leaf and prior over-cultivation. It is questionable whether the 6,000 HA estimate of eradication will be met. While eight million plants have been destroyed manually, aerial eradication with herbicide has not yet begun. If further aerial tests conducted in August are successful, and the GOC approves larger-scale spraying, 2,000 hectares could be sprayed in each of the last three months of the year. INCSR projections of reductions in the production and export of cocaine from imported base may be conservative, because lab and airstrip destruction in border areas of Peru and Ecuador (in GOC-initiated joint operations) as well as in Colombia has been more extensive than expected. Combined seizures of cocaine and base are 7.3 mt, which is close to half of the INCSR estimate for the year.

3. New Policies, Programs, Initiatives

U.S. and Colombian officials have been discussing measures to improve the intelligence and interdiction capabilities of the National Police in order to choke off the flow of raw materials from Peru and Bolivia. Another enforcement initiative has been the establishment of a South American Secure Communications Network; Colombia has taken the lead on bringing together police authorities in Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil into the system; the U.S. is providing the communications equipment and the computers.

As highlighted above, the lower house of the Colombian Congress approved a new narcotics control law which would permit more vigorous enforcement and provides for very stiff penalties. Further debate is scheduled in the Senate. The GOC has either signed new bilateral drug control agreements or activated old ones with Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Honduras, creating mixed commissions which meet periodically. In these meetings Colombia has recommended criteria for prevention of addiction; mechanisms for surveillance; controls in border areas; internal controls on production, possession and sale of precursor chemicals; checks on sea, land and air transport; and exchanges of information on presumed extraditables, suspect travellers, and deportable persons; studies on extradition; studies on prevention and treatment; means to secure technical and financial assistance; adoption of internal laws aimed at securing information on money laundering and other measures.

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Further, the GOC signed with UNFDAC three project agreements for 1) strengthening the Executive Secretariat of the NCDD and establishing in the office a data bank; 2) training of drug education workers; 3) establishing a nationwide media drug education program. These projects are to be funded with contributions of U.S. $3.0 million by the UNFDAC and U.S. $1.6 million from the GOC.

4. Status of Eradication

Until June the number of hectares of cannabis sprayed was in line with reduced cultivation of cannabis in the January-April dry season in the North. With the rains of April and May, spraying increased in pace with the appearance of more cultivations and the emergence of volunteer plants which apparently originated from seed which fell from last year's harvests. If the present spray rate of over 1,000 hectares a month is maintained, the cultivations in the main growing areas of the North will be largely eliminated. The arrival of two new helicopters (GOC-purchased) and two U.S.-funded fixed wing spray aircraft in October 1985 will permit deployment of a spray team to secondary growing areas, such as the Gulf of Uraba.

As mentioned above, testing of herbicides against coca is expected to lead to aerial eradication against such cultivations in October. Extensive tests were conducted in March, May and July 1985. Garlon-4 proved effective in killing coca plants in back-pack tests although the results of aerial tests of this herbicide are not yet conclusive.

5. Eradication Statistics

An estimated 1,884 hectares of marijuana were eradicated between January 1 and June 30, 1985. Spray operations were stepped up sharply in June (744 hectares) and July (1,115 hectares).

6. Status of Interdiction

The NP Anti-Narcotics Unit (SANU) took advantage of increased availability of aircraft and the seasonal low in cannabis cultivations to step up interdiction. Task forces, comprised of two or more helicopters and SANU detachments, were regularly sent on seek and destroy missions against cocaine labs and other producing and trafficking sites with excellent results. In an unprecedented operation in the Guajira Peninsula and parts of Magdalena and Cesar departments, the Ministry of Defense in February conducted a massive interdiction sweep involving the Army, Navy, Air Force and the

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NP. The operation order listed targets of airstrips, boats, aircraft and traffickers and their properties. Important seizures are included in the data tables. A new tactic of airstrip denial was employed on the operation, with about 30 airstrips being disabled with cratering charges.

Twenty-two airstrips were destroyed in similar but smaller combined forces operations. It is noteworthy also, that this air-mobile capability in the Amazon area enabled the NP to organize joint interdiction operations in border areas with Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, all of which were highly successful.

In a special effort to capture Carlos Lehder, the NP raided several of his properties in the Llanos. Although Lehder narrowly escaped, 355 kilograms of cocaine, U.S. $1.7 million, extensive communication equipment, aircraft and properties were seized.

7. Seizure Statistics

Principal seizures and data are noted. In a new departure the National Council on Dangerous Drugs and NP both reported a wide range of seizures of drugs, precursor chemicals, aircraft and other equipment. The following table lists these additional seizures through June (weights in kilograms, liquids in gallons):

Coca Leaf	45.8 KG
Coca Plants	7.8 million
Coca Base	785 KG
Basuco	13 KG
Marijuana Plants	936,460
Marijuana Seed	402 KG
Gasoline	85,385 Gallons
Ether	40,892 Gallons
Acetone	19,460 Gallons
Aydrochioric Acid	135 Gallons
Sulphuric Acid	3,418 Gallons
Carbonate	38,859 Gallons
Ammonia	956 Gallons
Urea	600 Gallons
Potassium Permanganate	361 Gallons
Weapons	138
Radios	66
Vehicles	124
Boats	18
Aircraft	5

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8. Other Enforcement Efforts

Concerned over the high incidence of cocaine seizures involving Colombian aircraft, the GOC cooperated with the U.S. in the conduct of a survey of physical and personnel security at Bogota International Airport. Anticipated implementation of the recommendations made in the U.S. Customs survey team's report, some of which were implemented by June, should reduce the transshipment of drugs via commercial air carriers.

9. Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction

An agreement was signed with the Office of the First Lady in July 1985, which allocates U.S. $200,000 for prevention activity to be implemented, primarily with the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF). Colombians continue to participate in the International Visitors program which brings persons to the U.S. for observation, participation and training in demand reductions and prevention programs. In January, 11 priests from diverse parts of Colombia received intensive training at prevention centers in Miami and San Juan, and have since started their own programs in Colombia. In February a group from "Partners of America" visited prevention and treatment centers in their sister cities in the U.S. During the month of April high-ranking officers of the Lions and Rotary Club participated in the annual Pride Conference. Many private organizations, ranging from the Colombian Red Cross to new drug treatment clinics maintained close relations with the Embassy in regards to information, materials, etc. In June plans were made to conduct workshops on demand reduction and prevention.

10. Drug Abuse Statistics

These data will only be available when results of an epidemiological survey, begun in April, have been received.

11. Outlook

Prospects are good that the momentum of the past eighteen months will be sustained over the near and intermediate term, presenting the opportunity to severely reduce marijuana and cocaine exportation from Colombia to the United States. Next year's Presidential campaign in Colombia is not expected to cause any flagging in the anti-narcotics campaign. With the delivery of additional helicopters and the enhancement of present interdiction capabilities, we should expect to see an expansion of seizures and a major dislocation of trafficking.

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Mr. SMITH. Why don't you proceed, Mr. Westrate. We also have your statement in full which will be made part of the record, without objection, and you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DAVID L. WESTRATE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORMCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Mr. WESTRATE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am also pleased to appear before this committee's Task Force on International Narcotics Control to discuss the current situation in Colombia and Peru. There have been several significant and encouraging developments since DEA last appeared before this task force in May 1984 on this subject.

We reported on the unprecedented drug law enforcement success in Colombia that occurred in March in which nearly 9 metric tons of cocaine were seized at a sophisticated laboratory complex in southern Colombia. While it is unlikely that we will again see a seizure of that magnitude, Colombia continues to make many noteworthy achievements. Significantly, President Betancur's strong commitment to drug law enforcement is the guiding force behind Colombia's successes.

Colombia continues to make significant inroads against drug production and against the major drug cartels. These successes are especially notable with regard to the eradication of cannabis and investigative and interdictory efforts against cocaine trafficking.

Colombia also has proven its commitment to upholding the extradition treaty with the United States by extraditing seven individuals to this country. Moreover, Colombia has emerged as a leader in developing regional cooperation in drug law enforcement.

These successes, however, have been met with an increase in violence, threats, and the use of terrorist tactics by drug trafficking organizations. Today, I will discuss each of these matters and, as you have requested, I also will highlight recent developments in Peru.

During the past year, Colombia has continued successfully in its effort to conduct an effective eradication and interdiction campaign. Colombia's marijuana interdiction record also has been impressive. Since 1981, the Government of Colombia has seized and destroyed between 3,000 and 4,000 metric tons of processed marijuana a year, accounting for about one-quarter of its gross production for any of those given years.

Significant achievements occurred in 1984. For the first time, Colombia initiated an experimental program to test the aerial application of the herbicide glyphosate against the cannabis crop. Nearly 3,400 hectares were destroyed in 1984 which, in conjunction with the seizures of 3,300 metric tons of processed marijuana, accounted for a removal rate of about 50 to 55 percent of total production. Although Colombia remained the leading marijuana source of supply for the United States in 1984, it is estimated that Colombia accounted for about 42 percent of the cannabis available in the United States, which is down from 57 percent in 1983. As of mid-September, 5,285 hectares of cannabis have been eradicated.

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Additionally, the Colombians have seized 916 metric tons of bulk marijuana. The eradication program has been so effective that overflights indicate that most of the cannabis cultivation in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Serrannia de Perija areas have been destroyed.

In addition to its successful use of glyphosate to eradicate cannabis, Colombia is aggressively pursuing a test Herbicidal Coca Eradication Program in conjunction with the U.S. Department of State. Nevertheless, Colombia's manual eradication campaign has resulted in the destruction of about 875 hectares of coca by the end of July this year, compared to nearly 2,400 hectares in 1984.

Although less than last year, the small decline in coca eradication reflects the allocation of limited resources to Colombia's cannabis eradication campaign, which as I noted, is extremely successful. Through July 1985, authorities also seized nearly 5,500 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride. During 1984, Colombia reported the seizure of nearly 22 metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base.

In March 1982, Colombia and the United States entered into the current extradition treaty. Since that time, the United States has requested the provisional arrest of numerous individuals from Colombia.

The first four extraditions to the United States occurred on January 5, 1985. These four Colombian nationals, Herman Botero, Ricardo Pavon, Said Pavon, and Marcos Cadavid, were wanted in the United States for violations of U.S. drug laws.

Two more individuals, West German citizen Liselotte Eberlein de Esser and Jose Alvanez, a Colombian national, were extradited from Colombia to the United States on May 6, 1985. The last individual extradited on July 10, 1985 from Colombia was a United States citizen, Phillip John Morris. Two of the seven already have been convicted.

Colombia also has requested the extradition of a number of individuals from the United States. On June 21, 1985, John Lincoln Tamboer was extradited to Colombia. Of the remaining requests, two individuals are in custody in the United States. The request for the extradition of one of those arrested, Theodore Bruce Powell, was approved by the Secretary of State on November 1, and this individual now has been sent to Colombia.

Of particular interest to DEA is the pending decision concerning the extradition of Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros. Matta-Ballesteros, a Honduran citizen, was arrested by Colombian authorities on April 29. Both the United States and Honduras have requested his extradition. He is wanted in Honduras on a murder charge. In the United States, he is wanted in the southern and central districts of California as well as in Arizona on drug charges. He also is wanted in Florida for escaping from prison following his conviction on immigration and visa violations. More importantly, however, Matt-Ballesteros is believed to have been involved in the murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena in Mexico.

DEA has always believed that regional cooperation is essential to develop an effective drug law enforcement effort. Toward that goal I am particularly encouraged by the International Drug Enforcement Conference, which we call IDEC. IDEC is comprised of the

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policy level directors of the National Police agencies in the Western Hemisphere and Colombia is one of its strongest supporters. The first IDEC meeting was held in April 1983 to discuss the development of bilateral strategies with neighboring countries. Since then, IDEC has successfully brought together the drug law enforcement community of the Americas. Border interdiction programs, extradition agreements, and eradication campaigns have all been furthered by these accords.

At the last IDEC meeting held in Santiago, Chile in June, it was agreed that six major initiatives would be pursued. Notable among these efforts are the development of regional communications and information systems, regional interdiction programs and regional control of precursor chemicals.

In addition to Colombia's participation in IDEC, Colombia has emerged as a Latin American leader in promoting regional cooperation in the antidrug effort. Colombia has been emphasizing cooperation with neighboring countries. Joint border operations have been initiated with Ecuadorean and Peruvian counterparts and good working relations exist between the Colombian and the Brazilian police forces.

Operation Relampago/Condor, an ongoing Colombian and Peruvian enforcement operation along their common border, has resulted in the seizure of nearly 2,650 kilograms of cocaine in various stages of refinement. This operation is expected to continue for the next several weeks.

Another example of this regional cooperation is the recent signing of a bilateral extradition treaty in Cartagena between Colombia and Venezuela. The treaty provides explictly for extradition for drug offenses.

Colombia also is taking measures to fight corruption within its Government, drug law enforcement agencies, and the courts. The most recent action in the attempt to halt corruption occurred in late August. Reportedly, Rafael Angel Ortega-Castro, the judge who absolved and released over 100 cocaine laboratory workers and bodyguards, was dismissed by the Supreme Tribunal in Florencia. Among those released were those arrested in the March 1984 cocaine laboratory raid in southern Colombia that I mentioned earlier. Ortega is the most recent of several judges who have been removed in the past several months due to irregularities in drug cases.

These achievements have not come without a price. Traffickers, on the defensive, are reacting with violence, threats, assassinations, and kidnappings. Their frustrations, directed against DEA and Colombian authorities, are in response to drug law enforcement successes.

This heightened level of violence started soon after the Tranquilandia seizure with the assassination of Colombian Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla, one of Colombia's strongest supporters of extradition and the antidrug effort.

Since then, Colombian traffickers have made many threats against the Government of Colombia, the United States presence in Colombia, and DEA specifically. Many of these threats have come from the fugitive cocaine trafficker Carlos Lehder. An outspoken opponent of extradition, Lehder stated in a January 1985 interview

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that if the extradition of Colombians were not stopped he would have 500 Americans killed. Lehder said he had established contacts with the M-19 terrorist group as well as elements of the police and army to form a force to defend the "national sovereignty."

Following the announcement of the extradition of the first four Colombians to the United States in January, threats against DEA increased. The threats are not limited to DEA personnel in Colombia. Some reprisals purportedly were to be carried out in Latin America, as well as in Europe and the United States. Given the immense resources of the Colombian drug traffickers, their demonstrated history of violence and their vehement opposition to extradition, DEA has been taking these threats seriously.

Colombian officials have also continued to be targets. The latest series of threats are attributed to the processing of extradition requests.

Unfortunately, traffickers often make good on their threats. In April of this year, Criminal Court Justice Alvaro Medina-Ochoa was assassinated outside his home by two men on a motorcycle. Medina was the eighth judicial official to be killed in the past 12 months and the 28th in the last 8 years.

On July 23, 1985, Superior Court Judge Tulio Manuel Castro-Gil, the judge investigating the April 1984 murder of Justice Minister Lara-Bonilla, was also assassinated in Bogota. Castro-Gil's death was the second murder connected with the Lara-Bonilla investigation.

These attempts to intimidate DEA and our Colombian counterparts, however, have only strengthened our resolve and commitment to our mission.

The threat to Americans in Colombia goes beyond drug trafficking—they face a very real danger from terrorist organizations. This situation has been heightened in light of the breakdown last June of peace talks between the various terrorist/insurgent organizations and the Colombian Government. Since then, there has been an outbreak of insurgent-inspired violence throughout Colombia.

Of the four major terrorist/insurgent groups in Colombia, only two, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the 19th of April Movement appear to have established significant links with drug trafficking groups to generate funds to support their activities.

DEA, however, has not developed any information which suggests these groups are targeting Americans at the request of any major drug trafficking cartel. Moreover, DEA has received no information which substantiates Carlos Lehder's claim that he was allied with the M-19 to kill 500 Americans if extraditions were not stopped. The general increase in the level of violence by the M-19 and other terrorist organizations, however, remains a matter of serious concern.

I will now highlight recent events in Peru. Peru is one of the world's leading producers of coca. A small amount of Peru's coca cultivation is legitimate as this crop is either chewed by a portion of the population or is used in the manufacture of legitimate commercial products. The majority of the cultivated coca, however, is intended for the illicit market.

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The Peruvian Government has endeavored to maintain a manual eradication program in spite of the violence which has taken place in those areas where coca is cultivated. In 1984, Peru eradicated over 3,180 hectares of coca. By the end of August 1985, 2,066 hectares had been eradicated.

Historically, Peru has cultivated coca and processed the coca leaves into coca paste and cocaine hydrochloride. These intermediate products have been transported to Colombia for final processing.

Recently, however, Peru has been producing increasing amounts of cocaine hydrochloride. One reason for this is the greater profit realized from the sale of the finished product. Another reason is the movement of some Colombian traffickers into Peru because of law enforcement pressure in Colombia and chemical control.

The newly elected Government of President Alan Garcia has taken positive steps toward fighting the drug problem in Peru. In addition to joint enforcement activities like Operation Relampago/Condor, President Garcia is taking action against corruption.

In August 1985, a large number of high-ranking Peruvian police officials were dismissed. These dismissals occurred amid charges of corruption within the Peruvian police. President Garcia maintains that he will continue with an active campaign against drug trafficking. It is encouraging that the Peruvian press has reacted favorably to the government's recent initiatives against the drug trade.

South America continues to be a major source of marijuana and cocaine destined for the United States market. However, Colombia's commitment to eradication and interdiction, coupled with its emergence as a regional leader in antinarcotics efforts, holds great promise for future successes. President Garcia's dedication and support to antidrug efforts also suggest continued progress in Peru.

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today and I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have. Thank you.

[Mr. Westrate's prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID L. WESTRATE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR OPERATIONS OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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CANNABIS ERADICATION

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Colombia remained the leading marijuana source of supply for the United States in 1984, it is estimated that Colombia accounted for about 42 percent of the cannabis available in the United States, down from 57 percent in 1983.

So far this year, nearly 4,500 hectares (11,100 acres) of cannabis have been eradicated. Additionally, the Colombians have seized 800 metric tons of bulk marijuana. The eradication program has been so effective that overflights indicate most of the cannabis cultivation in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Serrannia de Perija areas has been destroyed.

COCA ERADICATION AND COCAINE INTERDICTION

In addition to its successful use of glyphosate to eradicate cannabis, Colombia is aggressively pursuing a test herbicidal coca eradication program in conjunction with the U.S. Department of State. Nevertheless, Colombia's manual eradication campaign has resulted in the destruction of about 875 hectares (2,160 acres) of coca by the end of July this year, compared to nearly 2,400 hectares (5,900 acres) in 1984. Although less than last year, the small decline in coca eradication reflects the allocation of limited resources to Colombia's cannabis eradication campaign, which

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REGIONAL LEADERSHIP

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VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA

These achievements have not come without a price. Traffickers, on the defensive, are reacting with violence, threats, assassinations and kidnapings. Their frustrations, directed against DEA and Colombian authorities, are in response to drug law enforcement successes.

This heightened level of violence started soon after the Tranquilandia seizure with the assassination of Colombian Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla, one of Colombia's strongest supporters of extradition and the anti-drug effort. Since then, Colombian traffickers have made many threats against the Government of Colombia, the United States presence in Colombia, and DEA specifically. Many of these threats have come from the fugitive cocaine trafficker Carlos LEHDER. An outspoken opponent of extradition, LEHDER stated in a January 1985 interview that if the extradition of Colombians were not stopped he would have 500 Americans killed. LEHDER said he had established contacts with the M-19 (19th of April Movement) terrorist group as well as elements of the police and army to form a force to defend the "national sovereignty."

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Following the announcement of the extradition of the first four Colombians to the United States in January, threats against DEA increased. The threats are not limited to DEA personnel in Colombia. Some reprisals purportedly were to be carried out in Latin America, as well as in Europe and the United States. Given the immense resources of the Colombian drug traffickers, their demonstrated history of violence and their vehement opposition to extradition, DEA has been taking these threats seriously.

Colombian officials have also continued to be targets. The latest series of threats are attributed to the processing of extradition requests.

Unfortunately, traffickers often make good on their threats. In April of this year, Criminal Court Justice Alvaro Medina-Ochoa was assassinated outside his home by two men on a motorcycle. Medina was the eighth judicial official to be killed in the past 12 months and the 28th in the last eight years. On July 23, 1985 Superior Court Judge Tulio Manuel Castro-Gil, the judge investigating the April 1984 murder of Justice Minister Lara-Bonilla, was assassinated in Bogota. Castro-Gil's death was the second murder connected with the Lara-Bonilla investigation.

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These attempts to intimidate DEA and our Colombian counterparts, however, have only strengthened our resolve and commitment to our mission.

THE TERRORIST THREAT

The threat to Americans in Colombia goes beyond drug trafficking--they face a very real danger from terrorist organizations. This situaution has been heightened in light of the breakdown last June of peace talks between the various terrorist/insurgent organizations and the Colombian Government. Since then, there has been an outbreak of insurgent-inspired violence throughout Colombia.

Of the four major terrorist/insurgent groups in Colombia, only two, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 19th of April Movement (M-19), appear to have established significant links with drug trafficking groups to generate funds to support their activities. DEA, however, has not developed any information which suggests these groups are targeting Americans at the request of any major drug trafficking cartel. Moreover, DEA has received no information which substantiates Carlos LEHDER's claim

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that he was allied with the M-19 to kill 500 Americans if extraditions were not stopped. The general increase in the level of violence by the M-19 and other terrorist organizations, however, remains a matter of serious concern.

PERU

I will now highlight recent events in Peru. Peru is one of the world's leading producers of coca. A small amount of Peru's coca cultivation is legitimate as this crop is either chewed by a portion of the population or is used in the manufacture of legitimate commercial products. The majority of the cultivated coca, however, is intended for the illicit market.

The Peruvian Government has endeavored to maintain a manual eradication program in spite of the violence which has taken place in those areas where coca is cultivated. In 1984, Peru eradicated over 3,180 hectares (7,950 acres) of coca. By the end of August 1985, 2,066 hectares (5,165 acres) had been eradicated.

Historically, Peru has cultivated coca and processed the coca leaves into coca paste and cocaine hydrochloride. These intermediate products have been transported to

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Colombia for final processing. Recently, however, Peru has been producing increasing amounts of cocaine HCl. One reason for this is the greater profit realized from the sale of the finished product. Another reason is the movement of some Colombian traffickers into Peru because of law enforcement pressure in Colombia and chemical control.

The newly elected Government of President Alan Garcia has taken positive steps toward fighting the drug problem in Peru. In addition to joint enforcement activities like Operation RELAMPAGO/CONDOR, President Garcia is taking action against corruption. In August 1985, a large number of high-ranking Peruvian police officers were dismissed. These dismissals occurred amid charges of corruption within the Peruvian police. President Garcia maintains that he will continue with an active campaign against drug trafficking. It is encouraging that the Peruvian press has reacted favorably to the Government's recent initiatives against the drug trade.

South America continues to be a major source of marijuana and cocaine destined for the U.S. market. However, Colombia's commitment to eradication and interdiction, coupled with its emergence as a regional leader in the

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anti-narcotics efforts, holds great promise for future successes. President Garcia's dedication and support to anti-drug effort also suggest continued progress in Peru.

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today and I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Westrate.

NARCOTICS PROBLEMS IN BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA

Mr. Thomas, before we get into questions specifically on Colombia and Peru, you mentioned in your statement, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Belize, Panama. You did not discuss—and I know I did not ask you to discuss, but I would like to hear from you very quickly about Brazil and Argentina. What, if anything, is happening, and what we are doing. The latest that we know is that there is increasing production of a new kind of coca that takes place in the Manaus area in the Amazon region, and that there is increasing transshipment that is going on through Argentina into the European Common Market?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes; I would be delighted to.

I did mention in my opening remarks our interest in seeing that the coca cultivation which started a few years ago in Ecuador and Brazil is contained and then eliminated. Both of these countries have stepped up activities in that regard.

In Brazil, the Brazilian authorities—the Federal police have launched a number of operations over this past 18 months, Federico I, II, and III; Operation Eccentric, all of these operations are primarily geared against either narcotics, refining activities, or actual production in the field.

The coca variety which you referred to, called epadu in Brazil, is of a low cocaine alkaloid variety, but the amounts of epadu are so large that it poses a major threat. We really don't know the extent of coca cultivation in Brazil. The extent of the Amazon region, of course, makes that very difficult. A good deal of the coca that we have found, or I should say the Brazilians have discovered, is often under a double or triple canopy jungle cover, which makes its detection and counting more and more difficult.

We have had very progressive discussions with the Government of Brazil. I have been very pleased with some recent decisions by the government of President Sarney to set up and strengthen a national council on narcotics abuse to begin to coordinate the efforts of a variety of agencies in that country as well as their interests in seeing expanded information sharing and program efforts with the United States.

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We have been increasing our resources to Brazil. We have added a new individual to our Embassy in Brasilia who is working full time on the narcotics issue in addition to the other officials there—Drug Enforcement Administration and others. I see over the next few years an expanded cooperative relationship with Brazil in this regard.

Argentina I think has also recognized its particularly difficult problem in this area, which is primarily one of being a refining and transit country. They recognize that, particularly with other difficulties they face in Argentina, and their economic problems, and others, that they cannot afford to have this issue as part of their political or economic background.

So I would expect that our growing regional cooperation will very much include these countries. I was very pleased to see how invigorated the government of President Alfonsin has been on this issue as well as the President in Brazil, and the Brazilian Government.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

I would like to welcome my colleague, Mr. Dornan, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DECREASED COCA ERADICATION IN COLOMBIA

Mr. SMITH. Getting on to the two issues which we had wanted to discuss today in more detail. The first thing—Colombia. In your statement and in Mr. Westrate's statement both, there seems to be some indication that there is a bit of a lagging behind in the number of eradicated hectares from last year's level.

Can you give me a reason for that? To what would you ascribe this reduction?

Mr. THOMAS. I think you must have been referring to Peru in that case.

Mr. SMITH. No; it is just in Colombia in Mr. Westrate's statement.

Mr. THOMAS. Oh, in coca cultivation?

Mr. SMITH. What did I say?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes; all right, I was thinking in terms of both marijuana and coca.

Mr. SMITH. No, no; I am talking about coca.

Mr. THOMAS. The answer to that is that, of course, the coca is produced in Colombia primarily in the Llanos region, which is in the Amazon area of southern Colombia—very remote and isolated, areas where there has been a good deal of insurgency activity this past year.

The Colombian Government has primarily engaged, with our support, in manual eradication operations, which means more and more moving into remote areas of the jungle with troops, landing troops by helicopter, leaving them there for extended periods of time under very difficult conditions—and coca bushes, as you know, are very difficult to eradicate.

For that reason, we have been undertaking, with the Government of Colombia, an extensive testing of herbicides to identify a herbicide or combination of herbicides which can be aerially ap-

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plied. The Government of Colombia has been very aggressive in this regard and we now believe that we may have, in fact, identified an effective herbicide.

I was in Colombia 3 weeks ago, went to the test sites myself, which were actual coca fields which the National Police and army had secured for this testing purpose in the Llanos. There is no doubt in my mind that the herbicides we have been experimenting with can be effective. We need, because of environmental laws in this country, to be certain that we are in full compliance with the law before a full-scale program can start.

It is my understanding that the Government of Colombia will now launch an expanded aerial eradication program against coca. And based on those tests, we hopefully will be in a position to see an all-out campaign which targeted on the 15,000 to 17,000 hectares of coca being cultivated presently in the Llanos. This campaign could in fact destroy that vast bulk of production within a 12- to 18-month period, which would be a major success story.

In sum, there is no doubt that manual eradication efforts, particularly under these conditions, can be near futile, and that we must always be looking for more advanced technical means—aerial eradication is that answer. I think with some luck here, and with some environmental results to our liking, we should be able to launch a full-scale program in Colombia in the near future.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Westrate, do you have anything?

Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, if I could add to that.

I think we need to recognize the efforts this past year by the Colombian Government in the herbicidal eradication of the marijuana crops. This is a very critical factor in terms of the interdiction resources that the United States is deploying, as you know, in the Caribbean and related smuggling routes and areas. They have been very successful and we are encouraged by that and hopefully can transition from that successful program into the cocaine eradication, as Mr. Thomas has stated. So while the area is down, I think they are focused on the right solutions and we should make some progress this coming year.

PRODUCTION ESTIMATES

Mr. SMITH. How did you arrive at the percentages in which you do? You talked about manual eradication resulting in destruction of 875 hectares, which is 2,160 acres of coca, by the end of July, compared with nearly 2,400 hectares, or 5,900 acres, in 1984, although less than last year, a small decline in coca eradication, I wouldn't consider going from 2,400 hectares to 875 a small decline. It is a little over two-thirds down—that affects the allocation of limited resources to Colombia's cannabis eradication campaign, which as I noted is extremely successful.

We talked about there being going from 57 to 43 percent. How do you arrive at those percentages? How do you calculate what is being cultivated, and given that you might even be able to calculate like what's being eradicated. How close are you in those kinds of percentages?

Mr. WESTRATE. As we testified here before, in the estimating process it is very difficult to be extremely accurate. We attempt to

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do the best we can, utilizing all sources available and reasonable resource expenditures. I think we could be much more accurate if we expended considerably more money. But budgets must be balanced and so forth. Now, we are getting much better with the kinds of aerial surveys that are being conducted and sponsored by the State Department. We are using more photography. I think the actual crop-eradicated figures are probably the most accurate because that was based on recordkeeping of work actually performed as opposed to some of the estimates of how much total is available. While a lot of it is guesswork, we feel that it is as accurate as we can make it.

Mr. SMITH. So at best it is an inexact kind of figure?

Mr. WESTRATE. Exactly. It has to be adjusted from year to year. We think we have fairly good estimates. A reduction in the percentage of the crop coming to the United States, of course, is measured in different ways, seizures and purchases domestically, intelligence, and so forth. But I think we should focus on trends, and not be too much focused on the exact numbers. And the trend is definitely toward a reduction—a significant reduction in Colombian marijuana coming into the United States.

DECLINE IN COCAINE SEIZURES IN COLOMBIA

Mr. SMITH. Let's talk about seizures for a minute, which seems to be a little more verifiable and a little more accurate.

I want to welcome my colleague and cochairman, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. In your statement, you say through July 1985, authorities seized nearly 5,500 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride. That is approximately 12,000 pounds, or 6 tons. During 1984, Colombia reported the seizure of nearly 22 metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base.

Now, July is about half the year. In 1984, they had 22 tons, and through July you have got only 6 tons. Now, that is only half of what it should be based upon just keeping up to last year's standard.

To what would you attribute the reduction there?

I am not talking about eradication now, I am talking about seizure of partially finished goods.

Mr. WESTRATE. We have seen a change in the patterns of processing activity, in that many cocaine labs are being located in the Brazilian—Peruvian border areas, and therefore, they are outside of Colombia and more difficult to get.

Also, in the 1984 figures, you have the Tranquilandia seizure which was between 9,000 and 10,000 pounds in and of itself. We haven't hit a cocaine laboratory site with that much finished product in one spot, and I doubt if we will in the future because they have diversified so much.

On the plus side of that, the cooperation that we both mentioned here today between Colombia and Peru, in particular in Operation Condor, was an arrangement whereby Peruvian police officers flew into Colombia, boarded Colombian helicopters, and flew back into Peru to raid these laboratory sites. That had not been done before.

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As you can see, these operations raise questions of national sovereignty.

The fact of the matter is that they did put that operation together and carried it off to attack laboratory sites, and made a very, very nice seizure of six lab sites, aircraft, many chemicals, and 2,500 pounds of cocaine and cocaine base. So it is not a lack of effort—it's more a shifting in where the drugs and the lab processing is located.

Mr. SMITH. So, you would say our effort in Colombia is as successful as it would have been previously except that the traffickers themselves are branching out parts of their operation to other places?

Mr. WESTRATE. Yes; and it is not only caused by the pressure of law enforcement activities in terms of just arrest and seizures—it's also chemicals, the availability of chemicals, and the success of Operation Chemcon.

TRACKING PRECURSOR CHEMICALS

Mr. SMITH. I know I was in Brazil the end of May, beginning of June, and I saw, not only from our own DEA people but from the government people, an enormously successful program of tracking all of the hydrochloride acids, the components acetone and ether, into and out of Brazil—a significant nerve center where all of that is—you know, Brazil, unfortunately, is one that manufactures most everything. It doesn't import that much either in acetone or ether, and therefore, it needs some internal controls on how much is manufactured, but they are doing a fairly good job of it.

Would you say that that has resulted for us in an ability to reduce the amount being processed that's being sent from Colombia?

Mr. WESTRATE. Yes; and I would note in support of the theory, the fact that we have had a dramatic increase in cocaine laboratories in the United States in the past couple of years. Last year, I believe it was 21, and this year 27 already. The reason for that is the unavailability of chemicals in Colombia, and bringing the labs to the United States for the final step here, with chemicals purchased in the United States .

Mr. SMITH. Let me get a little parochial with you—I am about to file a bill, one of the provisions of which calls upon the Attorney General to provide for a study of the chemicals that are necessary for the use in processing cocaine here in the United States, to do something about it like they are doing now in other countries.

Would you find that beneficial?

Mr. WESTRATE. I don't know if we need a study of the chemicals. I think we understand the——

Mr. SMITH. Not a study of the chemical—a study of the ability to track the chemical and to do whatever is necessary. The United States is a little bit different in being able to track and possibly outlaw somehow, or reduce the ability to use ether-acetone, et cetera, because it is in an enormous amount of——

Mr. WESTRATE. It is a good idea if it is practical. We have tried this before in the precursors which involves a reporting require-

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ment. I am sure there are arrangements which could be made that could help us.

In the international area, we have had a considerable number of discussions, including the State Department, on chemical control—and we have a program that's really only been operating in a major way in the last 2 or 3 years. It has really been very successful.

Mr. SMITH. Before I ask Mr. Thomas something, I want to make a public statement which I think is important to make. Mr. Gilman and I—and he even long before me here, although I was working in another place in another forum—what I am hearing today, what I have been hearing from you over the last few years as opposed to what I first heard from Mr. DiCarlo when I first came here, is enormously different. And it is very much heartening, believe me, when I first came here what we heard was terribly frustrating—not only for us, I know for you as well.

Before you came, Ben, we talked about the luncheon, and the regional cooperative spirit that we saw at the United Nations that was lacking for so many years. I am absolutely fascinated.

If this same testimony had been given 3 years ago, we would have talked about the lack of keeping up, say, with last year's level in Colombia. And then I would say, how come we have broken less labs, or seized less goods—they never would have said, because they moved from Colombia to Peru and we are doing it there. We just would have said, well, we are not sure why. You know, they have gone underground, or it became too difficult, the Colombian Government has backed off. There would have been a whole rash of reasons instead of the rationale which I believe is appropriate, and that is that they are moving their operations, but we are ready for them, place by place. We have got those things on line, ready, and have moved, in fact, against them. I am much more satisfied that we are certainly moving in the right direction.

CONNECTION BETWEEN M-19 ATTACK IN BOGOTA AND NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING

Mr. Thomas, is there any connection between the M-19 attack on the Supreme Court in Bogota and trafficking? For instance, the murdering of the judges involved in narcotics cases or to prevent prosecution? What impact will the assassination of the judges have on our extradition requests—it may be too early to tell—and on Colombia's ability to prosecute? And if you know, is it true that extradition files were destroyed in the subsequent fire?

Mr. THOMAS. Certainly, the M-19 has had a history of involvement with narcotics trafficking, narcotics trafficking organizations as well as doing some narcotics trafficking themselves. So, there has been a historical pattern of narcotics activity.

Frankly, all of the details and evidence will take some time to sort out in this particular case. The fact that there was so much devastation in the siege and in the government's actions, the fact that there are no terrorists alive to tell their stories, will make the gathering of that evidence more difficult.

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President Betancur and members of his government have indicated that there are some narcotics connections in this particular activity. It certainly would not surprise me.

With regards to the burning or otherwise destruction of paperwork, files, and other matters, in the Justice Palace, yes, there has been some destruction. We are not quite certain to what extent yet. I have been assured by our Department of Justice that regardless of what United States provided files or information has been destroyed, that information can be duplicated and dispatched to Colombia in very short order—we are prepared to do so, and will do so.

I think you touched on the key point as to what impact this might have. I think it is too early to really know but I will give you an assessment based on my experience in Colombia and my experience with this particular Government and the national police. I would expect that this particular attack and these kinds of activities will only do one thing in Colombia, and that is to solidify perhaps more than ever the Government's resolve to crack down on narcotics-trafficking organizations and to continue to cooperate with us and other countries. They have taken a leadership role. I would see absolutely no reason why that should change. We have commended very strongly President Betancur's leadership in resolving this particular crisis, and I think that same resolve will be seen as we proceed with antinarcotics activities.

Mr. SMITH. We have seen some internal dissent, however. There is already an "anti" group starting to form calling for an investigation, and some people calling for Betancur's political head on the grounds that this was an overreaction, there was no attempt made to negotiate, and it was strictly a matter of going out there and blowing them out of the building.

Mr. THOMAS. We have seen other indications in Colombia; it is a a democracy, and there is strong support, including from the labor unions, and other groups within Colombia, including the media.

STATUS OF U.S. EXTRADITION REQUESTS TO COLOMBIA

Mr. SMITH. What is the current status of outstanding U.S. extradition requests to Colombia for narcotics traffickers? How many people have been extradited? Well, we know seven have been extradited.

How many requests have been refused, and how many are still pending?

Mr. THOMAS. We, at least at the Department of State, have not commented on the number of extradition requests pending in Colombia. But I can say that there are certainly scores of them, but we have not made any public comment concerning the actual number of extradition requests.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Westrate? "Scores" is an accurate statement?

Mr. WESTRATE. There are very many requests, but you must understand, too, that a request does not necessarily mean that the person is located, or that they are in custody. There are many, many very long and laborious technical and legal issues to go through with these extraditions. So, even though many requests

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have been made, it is not necessarily a negative signal that many extraditions have not been accomplished.

Our own extradition of Mr. Tamboer from the United States to Colombia took many, many months, and appeals, that ultimately went to the Federal Court of Appeals. But I would expect that to happen again with the ones pending here, so these are long, drawn out processes. It is important to note that we have received seven extraditions so far from Colombia to the United States. And, just this past weekend, the Colombian President has approved two more, so that is a total of nine. This has also only been ongoing for a year. So, that is a pretty solid start. We are watching also very closely the Matta-Ballesteros extradition.

Mr. SMITH. That was my next question. First of all, are you satisfied with the movement in the extradition process?

Mr. WESTRATE. We always get frustrated by delays. We would prefer things to happen sooner, rather than later, but basically they are moving forward at I think an orderly pace.

Mr. SMITH. What about Matta-Ballesteros? What is the status of that request? Do we think we are going to be able to get him extradited?

Mr. WESTRATE. From what I can tell, I believe that we——

Mr. SMITH. Isn't that the most important of all of our requests?

Mr. WESTRATE. It is an important request because of the connection with Mexico and his significance in the cocaine trafficking through Mexico and the relationship with Guadalajara and those other traffickers in Mexico in the Agent Camarena killing. So he is very important in that respect. He is not the only major cocaine trafficker for whom we have requested extradition, but we are optimistic. We have several charges, as I said in my statement, in several judicial districts—three drug and one nondrug, and, of course, there was a question about his extradition to his home country of Honduras, first on a murder charge. But I believe that is going to be satisfactorily resolved, so we are optimistic.

Mr. SMITH. Do we have any kind of expectation as to a deadline or a time that we might expect this to be done?

Mr. WESTRATE. I would not be surprised to see spring or summer.

Mr. SMITH. Spring or summer of 1986?

Mr. WESTRATE. At least that long.

Mr. SMITH. Let me turn to the other side of that. Has Colombia prosecuted any major narcotics traffickers since May of 1984, and if there have been any convictions?

Mr. WESTRATE. We haven't seen much activity in the prosecution of major traffickers, which is also a bit frustrating, but I think the Colombian effort has been so outstanding in the eradication area considering some of the problems in the Colombian legal system. I would like to see more, certainly, and we continue to press forward on this issue. But there has not been as much activity in that area as we would like to see.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Thomas indicated that one person at the Embassy now is also dedicated to drug eradication programs.

Mr. THOMAS. In Brazil.

Mr. SMITH. And Brazil.

Mr. THOMAS. We have a number of them. We have a narcotics unit in Colombia.

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Mr. SMITH. What is the amount of the assistance for narcotics control in Colombia right now?

Mr. THOMAS. For which year?

Mr. SMITH. For 1985, from INM.

Mr. THOMAS. For 1985, we are looking in the range of $11-plus million. Some reprogrammed funds went into Colombia. And for 1986, we are looking for a slight increase over that amount.

Mr. SMITH. Have they asked us for more?

Mr. THOMAS. No; in fact, this past year, and as we project ahead, I think they found that the Government request from Colombia, particularly the funding going to the National Police for their eradication efforts, and what our budget has been able to allow, have been pretty much in consonance. In fact, I am very pleased that, over the period of the last 4 years, we have been able to build up substantially on an incremental and very responsible basis the capabilities of the national police. They have basically now been able to absorb the equipment we have provided at about as fast a rate as we could expect, and will continue that pace of activities.

Mr. SMITH. What about what we did in the foreign aid bill with reference to the million dollar fund for arming some of these fixed and rotary aircraft that they are using in the drug fight only, with all the safeguards that we put in there? What is the status of some of the——

Mr. THOMAS. Of course, our view on that, regarding any type of aircraft, is that we are restricted in our own legislation and our own mandate from providing any direct financial assistance for the procurement of weapons or lethal systems. On the other hand, there are many other mechanisms for the Government of Colombia to obtain this equipment.

Mr. SMITH. Have they?

Mr. THOMAS. They are in the process of looking at systems right now.

Mr. SMITH. You mean, the M-19 is going to be taking over the supreme court building in Bogota, it shouldn't mean anything much to some of them in the field to be shooting down some fixed wing or helicopter aircraft that are doing aerial spraying or eradication.

Mr. THOMAS. Of course, the Government of Colombia has a broad range of military equipment, as I think the seige indicated very clearly.

Mr. SMITH. Have we upgraded our capability, Mr. Westrate, in Colombia in terms of DEA agents, both in Peru, Colombia, Brazil? What has been the increase in numbers, if any?

Mr. WESTRATE. In Colombia, we have proposed an increase of four special agent positions. In Peru, I believe it is one or two. We are not proposing an increase in Bolivia at this time. We currently have 10 agents in Bolivia in three cities and we want to wait and see the progress on the Bolivian side before we consider an increase.

Mr. SMITH. What about Brazil, given the nature of the difficulty, the size of the country, and the places where the crop is growing?

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Mr. WESTRATE. Yes; we are watching that closely, and as activity picks up, we will certainly invest more agent resources in that country. The one thing we are concerned about is security. The larger the staff gets, the more we are concerned about that question, particularly in Colombia, and the restriction on dependents.

SIGNIFICANCE OF TREATS TO U.S. PERSONNEL

Mr. SMITH. Are the threats in Colombia significant, and do you think that they are actual legitimately real threats?

Mr. WESTRATE. We treat them that way. We get many threats—mostly through informant information, as opposed to anonymous telephone call. The informant information we check out as best we can through polygraphs and we watch them closely. We are concerned about each and every one. We have a system for controlling each and every one and following up on the investigative activity. That is a continuing thing. There are peaks and valleys over a number of weeks but basically the information we receive is pretty regular.

Mr. SMITH. Do we have many attempts made on our people?

Mr. WESTRATE. No; not to this point.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome our distinguished witnesses before our committee.

NEED FOR INCREASED NARCOTICS CONTROL AID TO LATIN AMERICA

Gentlemen, when we were in Latin America this past summer, in talking with some of the drug-producing countries, they emphasized the need for improved communications in order to work on a regional basis and cited some equipment that was not expensive—the need for some choppers to transport their troops and equipment, and some other minor things that we passed on.

I am just wondering if any of those have been addressed, do you know, in the past few months, to help both Colombia and Peru meet some of their needs for regional work?

Mr. THOMAS. First of all, in the case of Colombia, we have been providing a stream of aircraft, both rotary wing and fixed wing, over the past few years. I am satisfied that the air fleet has grown at the appropriate rate, and I think the National Police of Colombia are too.

Mr. GILMAN. How much has been provided to them, Mr. Thomas?

Mr. THOMAS. We now have an air fleet that is approaching 20 aircraft. We are looking for additional aircraft this year. We are discussing the appropriate aircraft with the national police to come up with perhaps one or two more rotary wing and one or two fixed wing aircraft, troop transport or stol capability.

Mr. GILMAN. When do you plan on providing that equipment?

Mr. THOMAS. First of all, as soon as I get some money, Congressman, from our appropriation, in which I have not been able to sign any agreements yet.

Second, when we have finalized our discussions with the national police.

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I would expect that more equipment will be going in shortly. I should add, as far as I am concerned, and I think as far as the national police are concerned, the air fleet that has been built up has been very steady and very good. It is not just aircraft, it's pilots, it's trained mechanics, it's ground technicians. All of this has to go into our program. So the progress in Colombia has been, I think, very good.

Mr. GILMAN. Have any additional choppers been provided since August of this past year, to either Colombia or to Peru?

Mr. THOMAS. We have not provided any fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft to Peru. Some additional aircraft have arrived in Colombia, including the recent delivery of a twin Otter aircraft which was requested by the national police, and is used to transport troops and police into remote areas.

Mr. GILMAN. When did that arrive?

Mr. THOMAS. Very recently. I was in Colombia 3 weeks ago and it had just shown up. So I assume a month or a month and a half ago.

Mr. GILMAN. What about the Upper Huallaga region? What can you tell us about the progress in that project?

Mr. THOMAS. I think as has been pointed out this afternoon, progress, of course, is always difficult in Upper Huallaga. But this past month, we even saw some record eradication figures, for example, the amount eradicated on a daily basis. We now have some 900 field workers out eradicating coca on a daily basis. Even though we have had in addition to the 19 eradication workers killed last year, we have had a number of them killed this year—most recently, a civil guard policeman leading one of the eradication teams into the fields. But we hope, now that we are into the full dry season, that if we can keep the pace going that we have been able to sustain this past month, that we have a fairly good chance of reaching our goal of 6,000 hectares this year, which would basically almost double from 1984.

HERBICIDES TO ERADICATE COCA

Mr. GILMAN. Can you tell us something about the improvement of the herbicide for cocaine? When we were down in Colombia, one of our good representatives down there—who I see is seated with us here today—mention was made that there has been some experimentation on a new herbicide for cocaine. Can you tell us of the progress of that?

Mr. THOMAS. I can tell you that based on my recent trip to the coca testing areas in the Llanos, that I am satisfied that we are prepared to move into a broader testing mode, and we will be looking very carefully at the necessary compliance of certain environmental laws. If all goes well, and the tests that we are right now concluding work out in our favor—I think that they will—I would expect a full-scale aerial eradication effort against the coca cultivation in Colombia to begin sometime in the future. But I must hinge that, of course, on the completion of the necessary environmental studies.

Mr. GILMAN. You have developed, then, what is considered to be an effort for spraying of coca?

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Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GILMAN. What compound is that?
Mr. THOMAS. I would rather not indicate it at this time.
Mr. GILMAN. OK.

PROSECUTION OF MURDERERS OF COLOMBIAN JUSTICE MINISTER

Can you tell us what the status of the prosecution of the assassination of the Minister of Justice, Mr. Lara, that took place in April 1984? We were told that the judge who had been trying that case was murdered. Is there anything more recent that you can disclose with regard to that?

Mr. WESTRATE. There are four people in custody in that case. Three are charged with conspiracy and one is charged with the actual murder. I don't believe the trial has been held yet. But there are four in custody, and we hope it will be successfully concluded.

Mr. GILMAN. Is it true that the judge who was handling that case was killed?

Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, sir, I believe so.

Mr. GILMAN. And a new judge has been assigned?

Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, but I am not sure who that is.

Mr. GILMAN. Is that going to be held in the Palace of Justice where they had the recent hostage taking?

Mr. WESTRATE. I couldn't tell you, Mr. Gilman, where they will hold that trial.

Mr. GILMAN. Is that incident related to narcotics at all?

Mr. WESTRATE. Which?

Mr. GILMAN. The Palace of Justice shootup?

Mr. WESTRATE. As Mr. Thomas testified, we are not certain of that. There is a lot of speculation about it. I don't believe any of us would be surprised to find some relationship. Certainly, there has been a relationship between the M-19 and drug trafficking for several years and, we have testified many times about that relationship, whether drugs were a specific part of the motivation for the takeover, we are not yet certain. There were no survivors from the terrorist groups to be debriefed, and there is some speculation about destruction of narcotic-related files as a priority of the group, but that has not yet been verified. So it will take another week or two, I think, before we really sort out what exactly the motivation was.

Mr. SMITH. Would the gentleman yield on that?

Mr. GILMAN. I would be pleased to yield to the chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

LINK BETWEEN DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND TERRORISTS

I would like, if you would be able to supply this committee, and if it is necessary to do so, in confidentiality, the latest that you have from both of your organizations in terms of the direct links, as far as you know them, between narcotics traffickers and terrorist groups in South America, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, where the leftist guerrillas are operating. I think it would be very important. I have asked staff to pull together what you have given us over the last couple of years. I would like to get an update on it. If you can get it to us, then we will have a closed session on it, which I am

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sure Mr. Gilman and the others would be interested in having, because I am very, very much curious as to how much of a link there is between the various terrorist groups and the various narcotics organizations. My own belief is that it is becoming more and more of a direct link, and I would like to see what you have on that.

Mr. WESTRATE. We would be pleased to do that.

[The information follows:]

1. Relationships between traffickers and terrorist groups in each South American country. (Identify and describe)

DEA has no information on any significant relationship between drug traffickers and terrorists in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Surinam, Urugay or Venezuela. We do, however, have limited intelligence on Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. This information follows.

COLOMBIA

DEA has received drug-related information on four terrorist/insurgent groups in Colombia: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the 19th of April Movement (M-19), the National Liberation Army (LLN) and the People's Liberation Army. The FARC is the oldest, largest, best equipped and best trained insurgent group in Colombia. The FARC is basically a rural movement with half of its 25 fronts operating in areas where coca and marijuana are cultivated.

DEA first received reports in 1977-78 that the FARC was extorting money from drug growers and traffickers who are in areas of FARC operation. In return, the FARC does not interfere with those drug growing areas or smuggling routes. Recent reports indicate that some factions of the FARC have moved into coca cultivation. In November 1983, the Colombia Army discovered an abandoned FARC camp in southern Colombia next to 90 hectares of coca and a laboratory to process it. DEA has also received unconfirmed reports that FARC groups have considered international trafficking in cocaine, in exchange for weapons.

As part of their protective responsibilities, the FARC lets the coca growers and traffickers go about their business and often warns them of the arrival of anti-narcotics police or military patrols. The guerrillas control enough strategic points along certain rivers to prevent the police from traveling on the rivers while conducting anti-narcotics operations. The FARC also guarantees a number of clandestine airfields that are vital to the Colombian drug trade.

In March 1984, Colombian authorities raided a series of clandestine cocaine laboratory sites in a remote area of Caqueta Department in southeast Colombia. The enforcement action at the site known as Tranquilandia resulted in the seizure of several cocaine laboratories, all connected by road or waterway, 8,500 kilograms of cocaine, 1,500 kilograms of cocaine base, five fixed wing aircraft, one helicopter, large supplies of chemicals used in the cocaine conversion process, radio equipment, heavy construction equipment and about 20 firearms. Forty-one arrests were made.

During the initial stages of the raid the Colombian National Police (CNP) was attempting to land at the primary clandestine airfield when it came under small-arms fire from approximately 30 individuals dressed in green quasi-military type fatigues. The police overcame the resistance and these individuals fled into the jungle.

Three weeks later the CNP raided another cocaine laboratory site, known as La Loma, not far from Tranquilandia, and found a jungle training camp of the FARC Seventh Front approximately one half mile away from the laboratory. The camp had an obstacle course, firing range, soccer field, radio area, makeshift infirmary and a uniform tailor shop that was making uniforms complete with FARC Seventh Front shoulder patches. While no evidence was discovered to show that the FARC was involved in operating the cocaine laboratory, we assume the traffickers and the FARC had some type of co-existence agreement to operate in such close proximity.

The Colombian M-19 is involved in drug-related activities. DEA has received various reports of the M-19 extorting money from drug growers and traffickers, along with cultivating drugs. In DEA's most significant investigation of the arms-drug connnection, the M-19 was identified as a recipient of arms from Cuba via the smuggling network of Colombian drug trafficker Jaime Gillot-Lara. Guillot had an arrangement with several high-level officials of the Cuban Government in which the Cubans provided safe haven for Guillot's drug smuggling vessels from Colombia destined for the United States. In return, Guillot agreed to pay the Cubans for this facilitation.

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Guillot also assisted the Cubans by using his ships to smuggle arms to the M-19 in Colombia. In November 1981, one of Guillot's ships, the Karina, offloaded a large quantity of weapons onto another Guillot ship, the Monarca. Shortly after this, the Karina was sunk during a battle with the Colombian Navy and went down with an estimated 100 tons of weapons on board. Ten days later the Monarca was seized by Colombian authorities after it successfully delivered its weapons cargo to the M-19. In November 1982, Guillot, four high ranking Cuban officials and nine others were indicted in Miami for violations of federal drug laws. Guillot and the four Cuban officials are still fugitives.

Two other Colombian groups, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) have been the subjects of reports that they "tax" drug growers and traffickers in areas of ELN or EPL operation. We have no additional information to determine the validity of these reports.

Ecuador

Ecuador has become more prominent as a coca source country and within the last year has seen a terrorist group, Alfaro Vive, Carajo (AVC) become operational. However, even though AVC has been assisted by the M-19, DEA has no information that the AVC has had any involvement with the drug trade.

Peru

During the last four years Peru has been plagued by violence from members of the Maoist-oriented group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Members of the Peruvian Government, including the President, have publicly stated that Sendero Luminoso is involved with cocaine trafficking.

Although Sendero Luminoso does not seem to be systematically involved in the drug trade, it does appear to be using the drug issue as a critical factor in the formulation of its tactics. During 1984, several anti-coca projects, including a U.S.-supported crop substitution program, have been assaulted by armed mobs, resulting in serious injury and several deaths. Although some Peruvian Government officials have claimed these attacks are the work of Sendero Luminoso, they are more likely the result of drug traffickers inciting the local peasants who stand to lose their livelihood if coca production is halted. Sendero Luminoso's ideology is to create a rural-based revolution that will rid the predominantly Indian population of the foreign and "imperialistic" influences of the United States and of the non-Indian governing classes. Many of the Indian-peasants make their living from coca cultivation and Sendero Luminoso has presented the anti-coca issue as an example of the central government attempting to take away the livelihood of the Indian population. This provides a climate that may be encouraging the attacks on anti-coca projects.

Individual Sendero Luminoso units that operate in coca growing or refinement areas may extort money from drug traffickers although DEA presently has no evidence to confirm this.

Bolivia

DEA has received numerous reports of cocaine being traded for small arms in Bolivia; however, at this time it cannot be determined if these weapons are ultimately destined for political violence in Bolivia or nearby countries, or if they are for the use of criminal organizations. Bolivia suffers from drug-related violence as yet not associated with any type of political leanings.

Mr. Smith. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

LINKAGE OF UNITED STATES AID TO PERU

Mr. Gilman. It was reported recently in our local papers that aid to Peru was being cut off because of dissatisfaction with Peru's stance on foreign policy issues.

Mr. Thomas, can you tell us a little bit about what is happening in that direction?

Mr. Thomas. Yes, I would be delighted to. I would like to call the article which appeared in the Washington Post, first of all, ludicrous. I must admit, I was surprised that this issue was raised, even in some cases, after we were queried directly, my office and

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my staff, on the veracity of that article where we indicated that it was very much untrue in terms of linkage of narcotics assistance to any debt issue in Peru, other than, of course, those that we must comply with by congressional mandate, and other kinds of things which, of course, we would fully comply with.

So, to answer your question, there is no truth to that story that my bureau, for example, is linking any of its narcotics assistance to anything else that Peru is doing in terms of debt rescheduling, or the debt issue. We, of course, have some amendments to comply with, including the need for Peru to come up with a comprehensive plan on coca control. I have been informed that we should have that plan either by the end of the month or the first of December. We certainly are eager to get that plan.

Mr. SMITH. You will notify us, of course, when you get that?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir, immediately so. I should also say that I have been actively engaged in discussions with key people from our U.S. Embassy in Lima, including Ambassador David Jordan, on what we see as some additional resource requirements for Peru. And once we get this comprehensive plan, then we can sit down and begin to talk turkey.

I would like to add one thought here, though, because I am very curious myself at this outcry caused by this particular article that appeared in the Washington Post. Approximately at the same time, there was another article that appeared in the Wall Street Journal. This article talked about the damage that our narcotics control programs, many of them with strong, of course, congressional support, is causing to our foreign policy and our foreign relations. And saying that we should in fact maybe abandon our approach in international narcotics programs because of the diplomatic morass that we are creating for ourself and our Third World allies. I must admit that I received no phone calls on that. I think that if I could have used support on any one issue, I could have used it in this article, and perhaps people listening a little bit more carefully to what we had to say on the Washington Post article.

Mr. GILMAN. Apparently we didn't have the full report before us, and heard about the report in the Post. We certainly would welcome getting a formal report from you in regard to that, and maybe we can disseminate that.

NEW TRENDS IN PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING

Can you tell us, both of you gentlemen,—I guess we are being confronted with a vote in a few minutes—are there any new trends, new production areas, or new trafficking routes that we ought to be made aware of?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, unfortunately, there are many of them. But I think we are prepared as well. We recently saw some dramatic increases in marijuana production in Panama. We, with the Government of Panama, went in and sprayed a good share of it, and will continue that program. We are seeing, of course, increased production in Ecuador and Brazil. But we are trying to get ahead of that with those governments.

So I think the one trend that is clear is that there will be pressure in other governments to set up narcotics production and refin-

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ing operations. But those governments that are going to be targeted are fully aware of it, and are beginning to take the necessary preventive steps, and I think that is going to argue more and more for beefed up regional enforcement and international cooperation programs in the area.

RESULTS OF QUITO CONFERENCE

Mr. GILMAN. Can you tell us what came out of the Quito conference? Was there anything substantive that we ought to be aware of?

Mr. THOMAS. I think the most substantive issue that I would feel free to address is the issue of regional cooperation, not just country by country, although we will continue, of course, with our individual country programs—but regional cooperation among the governments. The question was asked about communications, for example. We are establishing, under my budget and via the Colombian leadership and with Drug Enforcement Administration hands-on management, a regional enforcement communications network which will link the key police force and military entities involved with narcotics control in the Andean region together. This will be a secure voice system as well as Telex, and these governments have been very eager to get such a system.

This kind of regional cooperation was discussed at length at our meetings in Quito, and the need to increase them even more in the near future.

SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN DRUG TRAFFICKING

Mr. GILMAN. There was a mid-year report that states that trafficking through Syria continues unabated, and that the Syrian military in Lebanon appears to be more involved in facilitating rather than impeding the narcotics trafficking out of Lebanon.

Have we done anything to register our concern with regard to that issue?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, we have registered our concern. We do know that given some of the difficulties, of course, in the region, particularly Lebanon, but also in the Bekaa Valley, as it juts up against Syria, pose some very problems to any law enforcement control. But we would like to see some increased efforts in that trafficking region. There is also heroin refining that takes place in Aleppo in Syria, and we are very concerned about that.

So we have brought this matter to the attention of certain officials and will continue to do so. But I don't see any progress in the near future.

Mr. GILMAN. There were some reports that some highly placed Syrian officials were involved in the hashish movement in the Bekaa Valley. Is there any basis to that?

Mr. THOMAS. I don't have any information on that, sir.

MURDER OF MEXICAN POLICE OFFICIALS

Mr. GILMAN. Can you tell us anything current on the recent massacre of the 16 police officials in Mexico who were attempting to eradicate the marijuana crop?

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Mr. THOMAS. There were 21 officials killed. I think basically the majority of the press reports that have been released on this seem to be fairly accurate. I think the key issue here is that we are seeing narcotics trafficking organizations in Mexico, as well as elsewhere, become so powerful that they feel they can threaten the authority of the governments in large-scale operations such as this. I think perhaps the Bishop Council of Oaxaca said that in that region for a number of years now, Oaxaca and Vera Cruz, the narcotics traffickers have manipulated and dominated the peasant farmers through threats of intimidation and death, and in some of those remote areas are very much in control.

Mr. WESTRATE. I would like to add to that. This is one of the first indications of the utilization of automatic weapon fire in a major way against law enforcement personnel and narcotics law enforcement. We have been concerned about this for some time, not only internationally but domestically, the level of automatic weapon power that is available to the traffickers is enormous.

Mr. GILMAN. Have there been any arrests as a result of that incident?

Mr. WESTRATE. Many arrests, and the investigation is ongoing. We expect some positive results.

Mr. GILMAN. Any progress in the Camarena case?

Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, sir; we are continuing to make progress. We are having regular meetings. The Deputy Attorney General of Mexico visited with us last week. We are moving forward in that investigation.

Mr. SMITH. At this time there is a pending vote on the one suspension vote, which I believe will be the only vote on the Medvid matter. So the committee will stand in recess for about 15 minutes. I have a number of questions I would like to discuss with both of you when I come back.

Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. SMITH. The task force will come to order.

We are missing a witness, I understand, but we can go ahead and proceed. I will ask Mr. Westrate some questions while we are waiting for Mr. Thomas since we have questions that concern both of them.

RETALIATION AGAINST UNITED STATES PERSONNEL IN PERU

Mr. Westrate, has there been any retaliation against United States personnel in Peru as a result of that Government's recent antinarcotics efforts? Operation Condor, for instance?

Mr. WESTRATE. We have had a number of threats arising during the course of the same period of time that we received so many threats in Colombia during the last 6 to 8 months. We had one incident where there was an attack on the house of DEA's country attaché in Lima, and we have had to relocate him.

Mr. SMITH. The maid, I believe, was at home?

Mr. WESTRATE. The maid and the gardener were at home. The house was ransacked. They asked many questions about his occupation, where he was, what he was doing, his schedule, and that type

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of thing. So we clearly made a connection between the job-related nature of these actions.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Brown from the minority staff has just given me a copy of a little article apparently from the New York Times, the 10th, Sunday: "Leftist rebels attacked the U.S. Embassy here today with dynamite and submachine guns, but caused no casualties." They said the dynamite thrown from a passing car exploded at the front gate. Embassy guards returned the rebels fire but the assailants escaped. The rebel group, Tupac Amaru Revoluntionary Movement, in a call to the newspaper, said it was responsible for the attack which it described as a protest against U.S. imperialism. What else is new?

There was in fact such an Embassy attack, Mr. Thomas?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes; an attack on the United States Embassy in Lima, not the first one, I might add. The same type of activity, automatic weapons fire and explosives thrown over one of the walls, and the Embassy sprayed.

Mr. SMITH. No damage beyond the physical damage?

Mr. THOMAS. No information concerning any casualties or injuries at this time.

Mr. SMITH. The incident with reference to the DEA agent's house—he has been moved to another area, correct?

Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Is that the only incident that we have seen with reference directly against a single person?

Mr. WESTRATE. Yes; other than the information regarding threats, it is the only physical thing we have seen.

OPERATION CONDOR

Mr. SMITH. Let's talk a minute about Operation Condor, which I think to some degree was very successful, and certainly will be a basis for regional cooperation and should hopefully spread to more than those two countries.

I understood one of you to say that Peruvian troops went to Colombia, boarded Colombian helicopters, then went back to Peru. Were there also Colombian troops involved in going to Peru?

Mr. WESTRATE. Yes; certainly in terms of flying the aircraft.

I would like to make a background observation here, and that is the success of IDEC, International Drug Enforcement Conference.

Mr. SMITH. Which is a law enforcement kind of group?

Mr. WESTRATE. Right, it is composed of operational executives from police agencies in each of these countries, including Canada, the United States, all of South America, and we had observers from a number of countries in other hemispheres as well.

The purpose of that group is to bring together the decisionmakers and the policymakers to outline law enforcement strategies. The importance of this is that these countries never really sat down like this before at an operational level or an investigative agency level, to decide what they can do together. They try and work things out. There are some operational things that are in preparation now that I cannot discuss in this forum. We are designing programs involving cooperation between countries so that the traffickers cannot move easily and successfully from one coun-

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try to another and find a new safe haven. We are very, very encouraged by this.

One of the most encouraging results was to see the arrangements for border cooperation, where border commanders, for the first time, really, talk to one another and coordinate operations.

So the Operation Condor exercise was one of the first, hopefully, of many such activities. We are encouraged that with the communications system that is being funded by the Department of State, that there will be more information sharing. We expect to continue meeting annually to sit down and review our progress of the last year, and plan what we are going to do in the upcoming year. This is very critical.

Mr. THOMAS. Excuse me, if I could just have a word on that.

Mr. SMITH. I was just going to say that the Ambassador to Peru, Mr. Jordan, was here before there was any public awareness of Condor, made the announcement, and we are all very gratified that had taken place.

What is your assessment of it from State? Is it the forerunner? Is it an isolated instance? Are we looking at Condor II, if you are able to give us that information? And how does Garcia's overall commitment stack up in that regard?

Mr. THOMAS. There has been an Operation Condor II, and I think we will be looking at other operations of this nature. In fact, the Colombian Government had a similar operation, although primarily directed against coca cultivation in Ecuador. Here is another example of Colombian regional cooperation where the Colombian national police, using Colombian helicopters, provided support to the Ecuadorean police and military in a coca eradication effort in the area near the Colombia/Ecuador border.

The Colombian Government has also, as Mr. Westrate pointed out, maintained a number of discussions with Venezuela and Brazil concerning border control operations—how to cooperate on the border areas, which, of course, are always very ill-defined. We see this as a growing trend in the region. In addition to stepped-up communications, we intend to provide operational support for these kinds of operations. Operation Condor is probably a perfect example of how it can work and perhaps should work. The political commitment by Peru and the new government of Alan Garcia indicate strong interests in carrying out these projects; the Colombian Government in its regional leadership role is willing to provide assistance, including equipment; equipment is provided by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, and information provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration and others, all coming together into a successful operation. That is the way it should work and I think that it is the way it will work more and more in the future.

Mr. SMITH. As I indicated before, a couple of years ago we sat here and heard a lot of hand-wringing stories about what we tried to do that wasn't working.

Would either of you believe 3 years ago you would be sitting here and having an operation between Colombia and Ecuador where Colombian helicopters were being used, and Colombian pilots were flying into Ecuador?

Mr. THOMAS. I agree.

Mr. SMITH. It is just unthinkable.

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Mr. THOMAS. Absolutely. In fact, if we would have proposed it 3 or 4 years ago it probably would have been equally unthinkable.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you: The first Condor operation netted a number of aircraft. A number of Colombian nationals, I understand, were in Peru processing cocaine at that location which was raided. And there were a dozen airstrips, I understand, four or five aircraft—one of which was an American aircraft with American registration. Did we find out who the owner of the aircraft was?

Mr. WESTRATE. I am sure there has been a full investigation. I just don't happen to have that information right now.

Mr. SMITH. If you would submit that information for the record. And if it has anything to do with an ongoing investigation, at least let us know that so that we will be aware. But I would like to be able to find out whether or not there is any connection between known traffickers or distributors here in the United States and the kinds of things that are now going on in Peru directly, or is it through intermediaries in Colombia.

Mr. WESTRATE. I would be pleased to provide that.[1]

STATUS OF ERADICATION PROGRAM IN PERU

Mr. SMITH. What is the status of the eradication program in Peru, Mr. Thomas? We talked about this before. And by the way, you have disclaimed any of the allegations in that article in the Washington Post—and I intended to agree with you. I read it and was very upset about it, but I didn't think it was so, certainly not from your bureau anyway. One never knows whether somebody else in the State Department is doing something that you are not aware of, but let's assume that they are not. Your denial is a believable one, certainly from you it is.

What about the eradication program in the sense of the foreign aid bill? What is the status with reference to Peru and Bolivia? Although we are not discussing Bolivia today, let's bring it in—as far as the foreign aid bill which the President signed 2 months ago which contains significant restrictions on aid assuming that there is no agreement to live up to former agreements.

Mr. THOMAS. We have every indication that the new Peruvian Government wants to live up to the previous agreements, which were signed in 1981, which set out certain goals for hectare eradication on an annual basis. The first year's operation did not start until 1983; 700-plus hectares were eradicated in 1983; and 3,000-plus in 1984; and we will see where we end up this year, certainly where we were in 1984. Hopefully, we will reach our goal of 6,000.

Now, we have known from the beginning of this eradication effort—that our first steps in the Upper Huallaga Valley were really just to condition a much broader eradication effort throughout Peru. We estimate in our 1984 report some 50 to 70,000 hectares of coca production in Peru. There are estimates that, in fact, there could be a good deal more.

The point is, that what we would like to see happen is that our eradication efforts in Upper Huallaga Valley will continue and expand, and that the national strategy and comprehensive program

[1] The material was not available at the time of printing.

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that the Peruvians will elaborate with our assistance and advice, I would hope, will contain elements of new fronts of coca eradication. The Upper Huallaga Valley is just one area and we need to begin to target as soon as possible on two or three additional areas, and this would be our goal.

So, with that as a national comprehensive plan, we can begin to target on coca production wherever it exists in Peru—that is where we would like to go, and that's, hopefully, where the Government of Peru will agree they should go as well.

Mr. SMITH. Let's follow up a little bit on this Condor Operation. First of all, do we have any idea who is supplying? As I understand, 5 of the 12 airstrips were paved. Who is supplying the concrete and other supplies for these jungle airstrips? It is highly unusual to have paved airstrips out in the northeast region of Peru, isn't it?

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Westrate may have some additional comments, but, yes, this is not the first time we have seen paved airstrips in some very remote areas. In addition to the concrete and paving materials that had to be brought in, of course, there was some heavy earth moving equipment as well. That's one of the reasons why airstrip interdiction and destruction operations are so difficult, because as you go in and destroy one of these so-called clandestine airstrips, they can be repaired and put back into order for the same reason that they were built in the first place. One of them that was paved was 3,000 feet long, which provides a very good airstrip for some of your heavier aircraft.

I think the answer, of course, is money. These organizations have resources at their disposal which allow them to bring in the necessary equipment and people. A lot of the concrete was transported by river. Of course, that whole area is intertwined with rivers and river tributaries—so, transportation is not all that difficult in some of these remote areas.

Mr. SMITH. In 1984, you indicated you estimated coca production in Peru at 60,000 hectares. Of course, what you broke up was not an eradication, it was a processing laboratory—in Condor; correct? It wasn't eradication ?

Mr. THOMAS. It was processing, yes.

PRODUCTION ESTIMATES FOR PERU

Mr. SMITH. When our staff reported that the Peruvian Government officials were estimating production at 135,000 hectares, that doubled what you had given for 1984. The estimates were kind of dismissed as being way out of line. Subsequently indicated that your original estimates were low. Now Peruvian Government officials estimate that there are approximately 200,000 hectares in production. This is very far removed from your original estimates.

What are your current production estimates and why are there these huge discrepancies?

Mr. THOMAS. The current production estimates that we have published as public data—the 1984 statistics which just came out in the Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, that's the annual report called The NNICC.

Mr. SMITH. You mean the one that's——

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Mr. THOMAS. That's the blue one, there you go, yes.

That's 50 to 70,000.

Mr. SMITH. Yes; we talked about this once. It is a good piece of work.

Mr. THOMAS. We just completed an aerial survey in the Upper Huailaga Valley and all of the data are not in yet, we are still analyzing it. So, I really can't tell you what indications we have—whether it is up or down. I would not be surprised if it is up. In fact, one of the key elements that we find as we improve our aerial survey techniques is that we usually find more out there than we thought was there, and it really speaks of the remoteness of the regions; the difficulty of coming up with an adequate assessment.

I have seen many surveys and studies in Peru. Some of them done by very reputable people that estimate, while standing on the ground, coca production in jungle valleys—which they have not walked through completely—and there is always a strong seat-of-the-pants sense to some of these estimates. I think there is probably upward pressure to the 50 to 70,000 figure. But, regardless, there is no doubt that when you add that 50 to 70,000 hectares from Peru, to a 35 to 50,000 hectarage level in Bolivia—there is plenty of coca leaf, far more than is needed to meet any projected demand for cocaine in the near future.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Westrate, what about DEA projections in terms of production of coca in Peru? The Government of Peru, which is under some pressure from our Government to begin eradicating significant amounts, what would behoove them to make a larger projection than a smaller one? Make it more difficult to read the target.

Mr. WESTRATE. I heard a discussion about that this morning. As you know, the NNICC estimate is an interagency estimate. All agencies in this Government who have a piece of the action participate in that committee. So, it is a consensus number. The people putting it together believe that that number can be substantiated by an aerial survey. They believe that the Peruvian estimates are much more subjective and, of course, higher.

My personal belief, having been through this and discussing this issue, is that the number is probably up. We are now approaching the end of 1985, so there is another year gone by from the date of these estimates. There's probably more at this time under cultivation. But whether it goes as high as 200,000 hectares is questionable. Maybe closer to 100, or 120,000 to 130,000.

Mr. SMITH. Why would the Peruvian Government raise the level? Because any significant reduction by eradication if on a 100,000 basis—5 or 10,000 would be significant. About 200,000 would be insignificant. Why would they do that? I mean, it is against all their best interests to raise the level of theoretical planting.

Mr. WESTRATE. I can't answer your question. I think your logic is good.

Mr. SMITH. That's nice.

ARREST OF PANAMANIAN TRAFFICKER

Let's talk a little bit about an October 17 article in the Bogota paper, El Tiempo, which noted the arrest of Orlando Guayarro

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Bonilla in Panama. Bonilla is called the brains of an organization of armed smugglers, counterfeiters, drug traffickers, and kidnapers, that operate in several countries. I don't think they are going to win any awards for civic service.

He, supposedly, was in charge of making connections in Panama with arms dealers to supply drug traffickers operating in Colombia with war material. It was also learned that a pool of Colombian traffickers acquired in Egypt, or possibly Libya, of some 3,000 automatic weapons to hand over to guerrillas.

Do either of you know anything about this article?

Mr. WESTRATE. I do not by that name or by that description of facts, no.

Mr. THOMAS. I read the article. I am sure that there are many people like this and hopefully we will arrest more.

Mr. SMITH. Have we done anything about trying to check on whether or not that is a legitimate news story?

Mr. THOMAS. I don't know.

Mr. SMITH. You don't know.

I will certainly leave the record open. I would appreciate your forwarding to the committee any further information you might have on that kind of thing and what the status of Mr. Bonilla now in Panama is, whether he is going to be extradited to Colombia or somewhere else; and whether or not he has connections to any of those that we already know are significant arms or drug traffickers in and around that region. And especially whether or not—and I would assume the State Department would be most interested—whether or not Colombian traffickers are in the Middle East, in Libya, or especially Egypt, acquiring automatic weapons. Libya is one thing, as an outlaw state to us, but Egypt is one of our best friends in the region. We would want to know. Wouldn't you want to know as a part of the State Department whether or not Colombia traffickers or any traffickers are capable of acquiring automatic weapons, some of which might be made in the United States if, in fact, they come from Egypt?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. I would like you to find out about it and let us know.

[The information follows:]

A newspaper article in El Tiempo, October 17, 1985 described the arrest in Panama, on October 16, 1985, by DAS Colonel Miguel Alfredo Mazo of Orlando Guayara Bonilla, an important arms smuggler, counterfeiter and drug smuggler. Of particular interest to the Committee is a reference to a pool of Colombian drug traffickers who acquired, in Egypt or Libya, some 3,000 weapons to hand over to guerrillas in Colombia. The Committee would like more information on this case.

Orlando Guayara-Bonilla was arrested in mid-October 1985 after Colombian police found in his residence a cache of arms (including rockets and grenades), ammunition, $28,000 in counterfeit dollars, several police uniforms and some cocaine residue.

In reporting this incident, the El Tiempo newspaper speculated, without explanation, that the incident might be related to an alleged attempt to smuggle 3,000 arms into Colombia. El Tiempo reported that an unnamed military spokesman had said that these 3,000 arms were being smuggled by a group of drug traffickers and were destined for (unspecified) Colombian guerrillas. The press did not say when this alleged smuggling attempt occurred.

In the same news article, but without showing any clear connection to the previously mentioned topics, El Tiempo reported that an unnamed security official had claimed that Colombian guerrillas were obtaining arms from Egypt and Lybia.

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At present, in the absence of more details, we view the El Tiempo article as speculative and somewhat sensationalist in implying that the Guayara incident is related to either of the other topics mentioned.

Concerning these other two topics (i.e., drug traffickers smuggling 3,000 arms to Colombian guerrillas, and the Egypt/Lybia arms connection), we have not yet been able to obtain any information of substance.

FARC INVOLVEMENT IN DRUG TRAFFICKING

Mr. SMITH. The November 6 Washington Times—now I don't verify or vouch for the newspapers that I am quoting—the November 6 Washington Times noted that the FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia, which signed a truce with Colombia in May, is believed to be providing security at clandestine airstrips and cocaine processing labs. Fears of damaging the truce, the story says, is preventing the government from raiding the airstrips and labs.

Has Colombia conducted any major raids since the May truce? If it hasn't, has it got anything to do with the truce with FARC, which apparently was not responsible for the May 19 incident?

Mr. THOMAS. There have been additional raids. Once again, in the Llanos area as well as some of the other areas where FARC operates. I think the story is semiaccurate in that, yes, there are indications that FARC is directly involved in some of its 28 fronts, with providing protection to narcotics trafficking and processing organizations. This was certainly the case in the Caqueta-Tranquilandia raid where it was clear that FARC was involved. So the issue, however, does not become necessarily one of worries concerning damaging the truce, but rather, one of firepower and difficulty of getting in and actually conducting raids in this area.

In fact, this past year, of course, and in 1984, we saw a number of casualties taken in these various kinds of raids—actually going into clandestine airstrips and very remote areas, landing, pursuing, often, very well armed individuals, including some of these insurgents. So you have got to proceed with some caution as well.

Mr. SMITH. The fact that there was a truce might have given those rebels additional capability to build up their forces and make them even more dangerous to the government on this basis. If they feel the government is not hunting them down, then they are not losing anything by way of government operations against them, it gives them a chance to increase their size, strength, et cetera.

Some people say the truce gave them an ability to guard the cocaine and to make them an awful lot of money from it without fear of losing any people.

Have we discussed this with the Colombian Government?

Mr. THOMAS. We have, of course, been looking at the whole range of connections between the insurgencies and the narcotics trafficking organizations. I can assure you that the Colombian military and National Police are fully aware of some of the connections.

Mr. SMITH. What is our stand in terms of that? I know it is an internal matter and we are not going to get too close entwined with that, but do we support them in their truce with the FARC?

Mr. THOMAS. I wouldn't say that we support or don't support them in their truce with the FARC. That is an internal decision of the Colombian Government. We certainly do support them in their

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antinarcotics operations and because of the truce or any type of peace negotiations, I have not seen any slackening off on the part of the Colombian Government against narcotics traffickers.

OPIUM CULTIVATION IN COLOMBIA

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Westrate, you have a number of agents in Colombia. I understand that there is a possibility that Colombia is now beginning to see the cultivation of opium plants, poppies. Last year, Colombian troops destroyed as many as 40,000 plants in one raid. Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. WESTRATE. I have never heard of a plot with that many. I think 2,000 was the highest figure I have heard of. We reviewed this situation—there was some publicity about it about a month and a half ago, as you know. We reviewed it again in depth. While there has been sporadic opium cultivation in Colombia, it has been mostly influenced by traffickers, mostly from Mexico who are looking for alternate cultivation sites. Every time we surface this intelligence it has been examined very thoroughly, much of it has been untruthful. I think every time that it has surfaced it has been nipped in the bud and it is not really significant at this point in time. However, we do monitor these reports very closely, as we do the spread of opium in any areas.

We most recently had some opium cultivation in Guatemala. I might point out that in our own domestic marijuana eradication campaign this year in the United States, we came up with seven opium cultivation sites interspersed with marijuana cultivation. So we do watch that very closely. But I would say in Colombia it is not a significant problem.

Mr. SMITH. So you haven't seen any major effort to plant opium poppies in Colombia?

Mr. WESTRATE. No; I just don't think it is of great concern right now. Although we do, as I say, investigate every instance, we don't dismiss it, we deal with it. The Colombian police deal with it. We meet with them and talk about this, and we have discussed it with them again when we had some publicity about 6 weeks ago, and we are certainly together on the issue.

Mr. SMITH. You have full confidence in the intelligence-gathering ability of the people that you have down there in the field?

Mr. WESTRATE. Yes; I do. We have taken samples of things to be analyzed. Some turned out to be opium, some didn't. We have it under control.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Thomas, do we have surveillance capabilities, satellite capabilities, on opium fields?

Mr. THOMAS. I wouldn't answer that, sorry. We certainly believe that the reports in Colombia on opium production have been followed up. Basically, I can recount to you what the National Police feel, that where they have seen instances of this, it has basically been experimentation, and it is something we are tracking very closely.

DISMISSALS OF PERUVIAN ANTINARCOTICS OFFICIALS

Mr. SMITH. You indicated that there had been a significant reduction in the number of officers in some of the ranks of the Na-

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tional Police and some others in Peru, some significant removals from office of high ranking and midlevel officials which indicated to you a seriousness about Mr. Garcia's commitment to drug eradication.

Do you believe that that will have any positive effect on their ability to continue in this regional cooperation? Were those people styming some of the efforts to begin with? Was it the former government or those people as well?

Mr. THOMAS. Certainly the issue at question here was corruption. President Garcia and his cabinet felt it essential to root out corruption wherever they found it. And apparently they found it. To the degree that that corruption can be contained and has been eliminated, it will have a very positive impact, of course, on our narcotics programs. If that's the case, of course, we are very pleased by it.

CODIFICATION OF REGIONAL AGREEMENTS

Mr. SMITH. Are we trying to get them, therefore, to formalize some of this regional cooperation that has been occurring between Colombia and Peru and Colombia and Ecuador, et cetera? Are we trying to get some kind of formal written documents as opposed to ad hoc kind of operations which we may help stimulate by virtue of our requests to the various countries?

What we heard at the United Nations was the significant commitment—Venezuela and the Quito declaration and this group, and everybody wants to be the forerunner, and the country around whom all this can coalesce, and so on. But is there any machinery, any mechanisms being put into place to pin this down to an identifiable administrative technique rather than an ad hoc, I think it's time I think we had another raid, and let's call Colombia and see if they are busy?

Mr. THOMAS. There is certainly a strong direction in codifying to some degree these arrangements. For example, I mentioned the enforcement communications network which will consist of most of the nations in the Andean region. This arrangement which basically has been brought about by the Colombian Government consists of signed agreements between and among the governments that are going to participate.

I think this serves as a framework for advanced and improved regional coordination of these kinds of operations. I think our goal would be a regional enforcement network of sorts that can work within the various systems we are dealing with. I think this is a clear indication that that is the direction we are headed.

NEED FOR NEW ANTIDRUG LAWS

Mr. SMITH. Are DEA and State working with local, or at least at the Federal level, legislators to try and get them to change some of their laws to be more imitative of ours in terms of assets seizure, and forfeiture, and longer sentences, mandatory punishment, and all the other things that we keep preaching when they come up here? The Brazilians, the Bolivians, the Argentines, and the Colombians, all of them have traveled their people back and forth here, and we tell them over and over again that these things help, the

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more you capture, the more you get, if you have got asset forfeiture and asset seizure laws.

Are we trying to promote them to do that? We are trying to do it on our end, I can guarantee you that. We pleaded with them.

Mr. THOMAS. One of the areas of strongest interest is in the area of assets tracing, seizure, and forfeiture. We have been making available our legislation and our experience in this area, not only to Latin American countries but around the world. The other area where we have taken a very strong role in working with legislators—I think the Drug Enforcement Administration should be strongly commended for this—is in the area of precursor controls. I can point to many countries where both the State Department and DEA have been involved with key government officials and legislators and help them rewrite the laws that will permit them to establish the necessary precursor control programs.

The same thing would be true in certain cases with extradition treaties. Venezuela, for example, indicated to us during a visit of the Minister of Justice. Minister Manzo, about 1½ years ago, his strong interest in seeing the extradition treaty updated—and they moved very quickly to do so. The same thing happened on the precursor legislation.

So there are some model legislative packages and, of course, the new International Convention Against Narcotics Trafficking being developed under the United Nations auspices provides us with a very good platform from which to take the specific proposals in that draft convention and see how they can be implemented in these individual countries.

Mr. SMITH. Of course, we don't want to wait around forever. You know, we don't get adherence to the 1961 single convention, and now we are going to have another convention.

Mr. THOMAS. No; my point is not that we are waiting for the convention to be ratified but the specific elements in that convention are those which we think have the most promise and individually we are working with countries to see them implement the elements of that draft convention—the elements contained in the draft.

I don't think we have to wait nor would we want to wait until the final ratification.

MEXICAN GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TO NARCOTICS CONTROL

Mr. SMITH. I have a couple of quick final questions.

I indicated what I thought was Mexico's way-off-base speech at the luncheon in New York.

Are there any countries with which we are still having problems, with which our dealings are, in our estimation, less than adequate? If Mexico's Ambassador's speech is any indication, I would say that that is one of the countries where we need a little shoring up.

I was very disappointed—no other country, none, had anything to say that was in any way close. He was mimicking—you know, something that was over 10 years old, that same old hype that was in the paper a few weeks ago, somebody else wrote that. It was a Wall Street Journal article—that same old claptrap about the fact that if there weren't people here who didn't want it, why, it just wouldn't grow. And all those people that are making zillions of dol-

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lars—they wouldn't look anywhere else in the world. And if they don't want it in the United States, let's not bother. What a bunch of nonsense.

Now, here's a man in 1985, saying that in front of a group of 25 of his colleagues, besides 4 or 5 Congressmen. Frankly, if I was him I would have been embarrassed. The people at my table were frankly laughing. They were laughing up their sleeves at what this man had to say.

Now, is that indicative of the mindset of the Mexican Government, and is there any other country with which we have still that same kind of relationship, that it is only our demand that in fact creates the growing, the source, the supply of this stuff?

Mr. THOMAS. Since March of this past year, we have had a series of meetings with both the Attorney General of Mexico as well as their Foreign Minister, their Secretary for External Relations, Secretary Sepulveda. And in each one of those meetings we have set down what we consider to be our primary objectives, and they have matched our calls for those objectives with their own.

I must say, based on our meetings in August of this past year as part of the bilateral exchanges with Secretary Shultz and his counterpart, and then Attorney General Meese and his counterparts, there was not much of a difference in opinions at all.

What I would suggest we do in this case is I would not think the Mexican Ambassador to the United Nations represents his government's views in this case. I would like to take those comments and perhaps get a more specific detail from you on what was said and make sure they are passed on to appropriate Mexican officials.

NARCOTICS CONTROL IN BELIZE

Mr. SMITH. I was just going to ask you if you would please take those comments, pass them along in the State Department, and ask them to pass them along to the Mexican Government at the other levels, because I don't think that man did his country a service at all, but rather, did it a disservice.

There was some slight indication Belize was talking the same way, although you have indicated that they just went through another round of aerial spraying.

Mr. THOMAS. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. The last time we spoke, they were still——

Mr. THOMAS. We were waiting.

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Waiting to see whether or not they would make that decision.

Are you convinced that, given what happened as a result of the aerial spraying we are going to have a continuing positive result?

Mr. THOMAS. The Government of Belize now has to make a decision as to how to proceed on an ongoing program. We would hope that their decision would be to continue spraying and that the next round of spraying would probably start in January or February. We are prepared to support them in any way we can. It is their decision, of course. It is their program. Frankly, I think they did a very good job this past month in that program. I think they will see now it is possible. They would like to do an environmental review to make certain that everything went all right before they

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go into the next program. My view is that there is a likelihood that they will continue. We certainly hope so.

Mr. SMITH. Have they used that new——

Mr. THOMAS. Glyphosate.

Mr. SMITH. Glyphosate?

One thing that was mentioned at the luncheon by the Ambassador from Belize, Mr. Westrate, was apparently some incident between their government and a DEA agent. Do you know anything about some negative incident that occurred?

Now, I know we don't even have a DEA office in Belize. We maintain one in Guatemala and we use the Guatemalan office to service Belize. Isn't that correct?

Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. SMITH. He made mention of some—which was apparently a significant, whether it was humiliation or embarrassment to the Government of Belize, by some DEA agent. I was curious if you know anything about that?

He didn't elaborate and before we broke up, he left. I didn't have a chance to talk to him. He was quite candid but very nice. I mean, he was not belligerent about it.

Mr. WESTRATE. It most likely pertains to an investigation where we arrested a former minister from Belize.

Mr. SMITH. That always tends to make them testy. They are testy over in the Turks and Caicos, too, I can guarantee you.

Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Alijeo Braseno, is that the guy?

Mr. WESTRATE. I think so, yes, sir. If there's something else, I would like to know about it.

Mr. SMITH. I don't know either. I would suggest you might call your Guatemalan office or speak to whoever—I just don't know. Maybe somebody in our mission might want to speak to the Ambassador from Belize at the United Nations and find out what he actually had in mind—if it was just this particular issue with reference to Braseno.

[The information follows:]

The Ambassador to the U.N. from Belize mentioned an incident in Belize, involving a DEA agent, to Chairman Larry Smith. He was, apparently, referring to the attached column by Jack Anderson. Do you know of any other incident? If so, what was it all about? Do we have any comment about Jack Anderson's column?

Ambassador Kenneth Tillett, Belizian Ambassador to the United Nations, gave the following information concerning the incident involving a DEA Special Agent.

Ambassador Tillett stated he was not involved in the incident and the information is from the Deputy Prime Minister of Belize.

On a date, unknown to the Ambassador, a meeting was held, in Belize, between some DEA Special Agents and the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Belize. During this meeting, the DEA Special Agents, through their choice of words and tone of voice, proceeded to lecture and talk down to them. The Deputy Prime Minister became extremely angry and embarrassed by the Agents conduct and attitude and walked out of the meeting.

Ambassador Tillett did not know the date of the meeting nor the names of the Agents but he said he would obtain this information and contact DEA.

Numerous attempts to contact Ambassador Tillett were unsuccessful and he did not return any of the messages left with his office.

During October 1985 there was a meeting between Prime Minister Manual Esquivel, Deputy Prime Minister Curl Thompson, Foreign Minister Dean Barrow and other members of the Belizean Government and Ceasar Bernal and Ann Wrobleski/INM, Sam Roberts/DEA Hqtrs., Robert Stia and Russell Reina/DEA Guatemala City Country Office, Mr. Scensry/U.S. Embassy Belize, Dr. Gallardo/AID, Washing-

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ton, D.C. and Mr. Keith Guthrie/Charge, U.S. Embassy Belize, the purpose was to discuss the eradication of marijuana in Belize using herbicides.

Foreign Minister Barrow, who is strongly opposed to this method of eradication, presented his reasons for not spraying in Belize. Mr. Barrow became extremely belligerent and uncooperative as each of his reasons was refuted by the U.S. Delegation and eventually left the meeting.

The Prime Minister and other members of the government did not become belligerent and continued with the meeting. Charge Guhtrie told the Prime Minister the U.S. Delegation was there to answer his questions concerning spraying and he had the final decision.

The Prime Minister eventually decided to initiate a test program.

PENDING LEGISLATION AND NARCOTERRORISM

Finally, Mr. Thomas, as you know, there is a bill pending in the Judiciary Committee which would provide rewards for information leading to the arrest or conviction of individuals involved in narcoterrorist acts. I serve on that committee and I am a cosponsor of that legislation.

Do you see any need to broaden this legislation to include rewards for information on narcotics traffickers as well, and do you have any input that you think might make the bill better?

I have concerns myself that the rewards of money to overseas people only by the Attorney General may have a negative impact from the Secretary of State.

Mr. THOMAS. I am not sure the issue of negative impact on the Secretary of State is what we are most concerned about. First of all, I think the bill is a very good one, the proposed legislation. The idea of doing more in terms of rewards and information gathering is essential, so I applaud the effort.

I have sent, in fact, a letter to the House Foreign Affairs Committee outlining my views on this which basically say the following: That we would like to see this type of legislation broadened significantly, that while we certainly need to do whatever we can to protect our own personnel overseas, that there is a need to do more. This is evident when we look at this past year, and particularly the last 18 months, and we see 19 of our coca eradication workers massacred in Peru; or a number of well-known narcotics traffickers operating within impunity in certain areas, often threatening our interests; and key violators of our own United States laws as they export narcotics to our country.

What I would like to see is a legislative package that would provide for a reward system that would also go after the key narcotics trafficking individuals and provide for rewards leading to what we define as effective apprehension and conviction. By that, I mean it is a slippery world out there and we want to make certain that we had the necessary tight clauses to assure that the intent of the legislation was carried out.

You know, there is a good precedent for this—a 1984 act on international terrorism provides a system whereby the Department of Justice administers the domestic reward system and the Department of State administers the international system. That is my view, and I can assure that is the Secretary of State's view. We are going to be very strong advocates for this. In fact, my position would be: I think this is essential at this point, that we have a reward system to go after the narcotics violators as well as any-

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body that would threaten our individuals or property. And as we try and crack down on these organizations, destabilize them through taking away their assets, or destabilize them by arresting them, or going in and busting up their laboratories, that this would be one more key element that I think is crucial at this stage.

So I look forward to working with you in any way we can to obtaining an effective piece of legislation here that will provide us and the Department of State with an effective tool to pay rewards under the right conditions—right, tight, good conditions—working, by the way, with host governments and foreign governments. I think that is an essential part of this—where we could work, perhaps, even on a cobasis with some governments in providing the reward money, but also to give us the necessary flexibility I think we need to implement this kind of move.

OPERATION HAT TRICK 2

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Westrate, to both of you actually, we have acknowledged now about Hat Trick 2, and it is apparently an extremely well organized, very diverse, very integrated, multinational effort.

Can you give me a little bit of information about it?

Mr. WESTRATE. We are really not at liberty to go beyond the Vice President's press release of Monday. But, I think your description is a fairly good one. More will be forthcoming as it proceeds. I don't believe an open forum is the appropriate place for us to go further than what has been been released publicly. That release was calculated to provide as much information as was appropriate at the time, so I would prefer to defer that question until later.

Mr. THOMAS. I would agree with that. I would just add that we have been fully supportive of this operation as we were Hat Trick 1.

Mr. SMITH. You were both brought into this?

Mr. WESTRATE. From the very beginning.

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, from the very beginning, both operations.

DEA plays a strong role in this and so does my bureau, in fact, in working with the other governments that are involved.

Mr. SMITH. Who is paying for this?

Mr. THOMAS. A lot of people are paying for it, as part of many agencies' budgets.

Mr. SMITH. DOD?

Mr. THOMAS. I can't give you an accurate breakdown at this point. I am sure that once the operation is underway and perhaps is winding up, those kinds of data will be made available.

Mr. WESTRATE. As the release stated, DOD is involved.

Mr. SMITH. I am very happy to see that for a change.

I have no further questions.

We are going to submit some questions to you for the record in addition to those I have already asked you about, for you to comment on and send back to us. I would appreciate it if you would do so at your earliest convenience. I am going to leave the record open for that purpose.

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. We are really appreciative.

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The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the task force was adjourned.]

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APPENDIX 1

Questions Submitted in Writing to DEA by the Task Force on International Narcotics Control and Responses Thereto

1. What significance is there, if any, in the recent announcement that drug cases will be returned to the civil courts and that some 25 new judges will be appointed to handle such cases? Or does it make any difference, given that very few traffickers are ever convicted.

There is not much significance to this action beyond relieving congestion in the courts. In Columbia judges are easily intimidated by the wealthy traffickers who can afford to hire assassins or bring political pressure to bear through well placed friends. For the last five years there has been one judge assassinated every two months in Colombia. Last week, a speech before the Colombian National Bar Association, the current justice minister criticized the permissiveness with which the Colombian society allows its judges to serve the interests of the drug traffickers. He also criticized some lawyers for accepting huge fees from drug traffickers and lamented that a proposed law designed to uncover the criminal sources of some political contributions has not prospered in the Colombian congress.

2. Have there been any tangible results from the bilateral working group established between Venezuela and Colombia?

Yes. The group has updated the extradition treaty between these two countries to include drug trafficking offenses.

3. What efforts are being made to track percursor chemicals (ether and acetone) in Colombia?

Since 1982 the importation and marketing of ether and acetone have been tightly controlled in Colombia. A specific license, issued by the National Drug Council, is required in order to handle these precursors. All unlicensed shipments of precursors are forfeitable, and Colombian authorities regularly seize large quantities of them. These restrictions have driven the black market price of a 55-gallon drum of ether to over $6,000 when the legitimate price is less than $500.

4. Colombia recently ordered several legal procedure changes which are apparently designed to release people who have served two years in prison. Could you give us more details on these changes, including any impact they might have on narcotics traffickers?

This release program is primarily a pretrial release program designed to relieve over crowding in jails. It will not be applied to all prisoners who have served two years in prison. It will be applied to people who have been arrested for misdemeanor type violations and who have been in custody for two years awaiting trail. Defendants in jail awaiting trial on drug charges or other serious crimes will not benefit from this new procedure.

5. In July, the Mexican Government detained a Colombian boat transporting 24 tons of marijuana to the United States. This boat was apparently a part of a "fleet" of Colombian trafficking boats. Can you tell us anything about the owners of the boat, and any actions taken pursuant to the seizure of the boat?

The name of the vessel was the *ERIKA PATRICIA*, but it had also used several other names in the past. It was put on lookout as a suspected vessel by DEA in Barranquilla, Colombia on December 13, 1984. On July 5, 1985 the Mexican Coast Guard found it aground near the Yacatan Peninsula, arrested nine Colombian crewmen and seized and burned the marijuana. Our investigation shows the vessel was registered in Colombia in the name of Antonio Hernadez. This is probably an alias. As far as we know, the nine Colombian crewmembers are still in jail in Mexico.

6. Has Colombia ratified the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States?

No. But even without the treaty we have been able to obtain evidence in Colombia for prosecutions in the U.S.

7. How many aircraft has Colombia seized from the traffickers in 1985: Has the government used any of these planes for the eradication program? If not, why?

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Colombian authorities have seized about two dozen aircraft from traffickers so far this year. At least three of these have been assigned to the eradication program.

8. What is your estimate of the value of the marijuana and coca crops to the Colombian economy? How much of that money do you estimate actually stays in Colombia?

We estimate that the wholesale value of Colombia's marijuana crop was roughly $1 billion in 1984, which amounts to about 2.5% of the GNP. The wholesale value of cocaine produced from Colombian coca we estimate at less than $25 million. We believe that less than half of the money earned from drug exports remains in Colombia.

9. In early August, Peruvian police discovered a shipment of guns and cocaine from the Far East aboard a Peruvian ship. Could you elaborate on the origins and destination of the ship?

On August 5, Peruvian anti-drug police reported the seizure of a large arms shipment on the Peruvian vessel "Palma" in the port of Callao. The shipment included numerous machine-guns, bazookas, hand grenades, and ammunition. The police officers uncovered information which indicated the shipment may have originated in the Orient, but the exact country was not specified. The arms were found packed in cardboard boxes in the crews quarters. The most recent port visited by the vessel had been Arico, Chile. In addition to the weapons approximately 11 kilos of cocaine were sized. No further information is available at this time.

10. On November 1, one of Peru's drug "kingpins" was arrested, Reynaldo Rodriquez. Reportedly, this has led to a huge man-hunt for his accomplices in what has been described as the greatest drug-trafficking operation yet discovered in Peru. What can you tell us about this case?

This is an active investigation and cannot be commented upon.

11. In a recent New York Times article, it was reported that Federal drug enforcement officials were looking into allegations that officers of the Mexican Federal Police, armed with pistols and machine guns, have begun escorting marijuana, cocaine and heroin traffickers across the border to Texas. Can you give us any further information on these allegations?

DEA has received uncorroborated intelligence from sources of information that heavily armed corrupt Federal officials (DRS) have escorted loads of drug contraband throughout Mexico for smuggling into the U.S. We are continuing to pursue this information in the hopes of verifying the information and indicating those responsible.

12. What is the status of negotiations between the U.S. and the Bahamas on a mutual legal assistance treaty? These negotiations have been going on for some time—is there a prospect for their favorable conclusion?

The negotiations between the U.S. and the Bahamas on a mutual legal assistance treaty have been completed. Agreement has been reached between the representatives of both countries.

13. Two weeks ago, Venezuelan authorities seized more than 700 kilos of pure cocaine—one of the largest seizures in Latin America. Does this indicate Venezuela is increasingly becoming a drug transshipment point?

We have long recognized the fact that Venezuela is frequently utilized as a transit route for the narcotic traffic between Colombia and the United States. Prior to the recent 700 kilogram case, seizures were less significant.

14. One of the Mexican narcotics traffickers who was being held in a Mexican jail on suspicion of involvement in our DEA agent's murder escaped from jail last week, apparently with the assistance of his guards. Reportedly, his escape was not even noted for four days. Do you have any information on this development?

Contreras Subias escaped from jail in Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico on October 25, 1985. Currently our DEA San Diego office is receiving intelligence information which indicates that Contreras Subias is still in Mexico and has provided leads to the Mexican Federal Judicial Police. The Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) stationed in Tijuana, BC, Mexico are conducting an investigation into the escape and have apprehended some of those responsible. However, the MFJP have not provided DEA with the details of their investigation at this time. Contreras Subias was being held for the murder of a Mexican Federal Judicial Police Officer.

15. It has been reported that DEA has agreed to assist Barbados and Antigua by establishing an anti-narcotics squad. Could you give us any details on this?

The DEA Miami office has cooperated with Antigua authorities in joint investigations. They will also be assisting Antigua to set up a narcotic squard.

The Miami office also plans to determine assistance needs in Barbados in the near future.

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16. Reportedly, the Administration has stepped up its efforts to establish legal assistance agreements with bank secrecy countries. How is this effort proceeding? And what is the status of negotiations with the Cayman Islands?

This Administration is currently negotiating legal assistance agreements with the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands, and Cayman Islands. Most of these are in the early discussion phase. A draft legal assistance agreement is being reviewed by the Bahamians and U.S. Governments in order to reach agreement on text. Subsequent to this, the agreement must be signed by the U.S. and the Bahamas and then it must be ratified.

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APPENDIX 2

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED IN WRITING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BY THE TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL, AND RESPONSES THERETO

1. Since May, 1984, how many judges, police and military officials have been removed from office for reasons of narcotics corruption?

Answer: We do not have statistics on removal for narcotics corruption. We do know of many cases where punishment has been meted out to corrupt officials:

Rafael Angel Ortega Castro, the judge who absolved and released numerous persons detained in the March 1984 Tranquilandia cocaine lab raids was dismissed by a Supreme Tribunal in Florencia in August 1985. The press reported that Ortega is but one of several judges removed on similar grounds over the last several months.

The army sentenced six officers in September 1985 for their roles in an army unit's collaboration with traffickers in dismantling and moving a cocaine lab from a guerrilla infested site near the Yari River in the Amazon area to a more secure location.

In May 1985 three judges of the Armenia Superior Court who, during a penal process against Carlos Lehder exonerated him of drug charges, were eliminated from consideration for renewal of their judgeships.

In August 1985 six officers and thirteen marines of the navy were convicted of removing ether from 155 drums placed in a navy warehouse following seizure by the police.

In October 1985 six regular policemen were detained in the disappearance of cocaine seized by narcotics police.

2. What significance is there, if any, in the recent announcement that drug cases will be returned to the civil courts and that some 25 new judges will be appointed to handle such cases? Or does it make any difference, given that very few traffickers are ever convicted?

Answer: The action taken under the State of Emergency in 1984 giving authority over narcotics cases to military courts was a temporary measure taken in the wake of the assassination of the Minister of Justice.

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The hope was that military courts would administer swifter and surer justice without the long delays, and intimidation that are common in the lower rungs of the Colombian criminal justice system. The year-and one-half period in which the military courts tried drug cases resulted in more expeditious trial for some lower-level drug criminals, but the armed services were never comfortable in the role of handling civilian criminal cases and were desirous to turn the job back to the civilian courts. Appointment of new judges to relieve court congestion is a positive step, but it is still too early to conclude what effect this jurisdictional change and the appointment of new judges will have on prosecution of narcotics traffickers. The Colombian judiciary -- notably the Supreme Court -- has in the past acted courageously in the face of continued terrorist threat, as witnessed by the court's approval of U.S. extradition requests.

3. Has Colombia impounded any assets of drug traffickers?

Answer: In August 1985 the Ministry of Defense reported the following drug-connected seizures of property from early 1984 to mid-1985:

Arms	1,576
Radios	255
Vehicles	582
Boats	34
Aircraft	75.

The real estate of some traffickers is under confiscation proceedings. The most notable case involves the Carlos Lehder Ranch near Puerto Gaitan, Meta. Colombia also has seized over two million dollars from traffickers in the past two years.

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4. Has there ever been a comprehensive survey of drug growing areas in Colombia?

Answer: The Colombian Government, with the cooperation of INM and guidance, flew two aerial surveys of the traditional marijuana growing areas in northern Colombia in 1985. The initial survey was a visual reconnaissance to observe the results of the eradication program and to identify new marijuana cultivation in the 1985 crop season. The second survey, in July, was designed to provide color aerial photography of the primary traditional growing areas in northern Colombian in order to make an estimate of areas under cultivation and eventual production. The Colombian government and INM are planning to continue these surveys in 1986 with another visual reconnaissance in the spring and a photographic survey in the summer. The 1986 surveys will be designed to observe the traditional cultivation areas and shifts to new areas of potential cultivation.

5. What programs has UNFDAC initiated in Colombia?

Answer: UNFDAC has a number of interrelated projects in Colombia whose overall purpose is to help develop drug abuse prevention activities, to support treatment and rehabilitation centers, to strengthen manpower resources through fellowships, training seminars and courses, and to carry out epidemiological studies. Besides these projects aimed at drug abuse, UNDFAC also has a crop substitution/ rural development project in the Cauca Valley.

6. Have there been any tangible results from the bilateral working group established between Venezuela and Colombia?

Answer: The National Police and Ministry of Justice report that working-level commissions have been established at five towns on the border. They hold monthly meetings on implementing bilateral agreements for the exchange of law enforcement information, control of precursor chemicals and other provisions.

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This cooperation has led to numerous seizures of narcotics and chemicals. More important are the many trafficker incursions which have been suppressed by these preventive measures. Further, the two countries have added extradition to an existing bilateral agreement.

7. Have Brazil and Colombia formalized any bilateral narcotics control agreements pursuant to discussions on this subject last year?

Answer: Colombia and Brazil in May 1984 did formalize an agreement on narcotics control cooperation following their talks last year.

8. As you know, in the foreign aid authorization bill Congress earmarked 1 million dollars in grant MAP funds to defensively arm anti-narcotics aircraft overseas. Will INM request that any of these funds be used in Colombia? Have you begun discussions with DOD on how the program will be allocated?

Answer: Our Embassy has already requested that MAP funds be used to arm some of the Colombian National Police helicopters used in eradication and interdiction. We are discussing with DoD how this authority to use MAP funds in this way will be used.

9. Colombia recently ordered several legal procedure changes which are apparently designed to release people who have served two years in prison. Could you give us more details on these changes, including any impact they might have on narcotics traffickers?

Answer: Colombia's prisons have been seriously overcrowded and understaffed due to the practice of preventive detention and inadequate budgets. In an effort to relieve backlogs of court congestion which result in long pretrial detentions, the Colombian Congress recently adopted Law 1853 which eliminates provisional arrest for defendants charged with misdemeanors. As of late September 1985, approximately

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3,000 prisoners had been released under provisions of this law. This provision is unlikely to result in the release of any narcotics traffickers unless, of course, they were held on misdemeanor charges, such as possession of small quantities of drugs deemed for personal use.

10. Has Colombia ratified the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States?

Answer: The Treaty has passed the Senate but it has not yet been approved by the Chamber of Deputies.

11. How many aircraft has the U.S. provided Colombia for narcotics control? Has Colombia procured aircraft for narcotics control purposes from any other sources? Where are these aircraft located--are they spread around the country or all in one place? Are there sufficient numbers of Colombian pilots to fly these planes?

Answer: The U.S. has provided ten rotary-wing aircraft and five fixed-wing aircraft. In 1985 using its own resources, the GOC purchased seven Bell helicopters for National Police use, four of which have been used almost exclusively for narcotics control since arrival earlier this year. Two arriving in December and one in January also are to be incorporated into the program. Program aircraft are deployed at advance bases in zones of narcotics activity, from Santa Marta in the north to Leticia and, on occasion, Puerto Asis in the Amazon area. The availability of these aircraft permitted undertaking joint raids with Peru and Ecuador on targets in remote border areas [Operations Condor and Relampago]. The National Police have just enough pilots. There was a temporary shortage of Bell 212 pilots recently due to absences for health/medical and administrative reasons. A continuing training program will soon build up an adequate reserve of pilots. In the interim, two have been detailed from the Colombian navy.

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12. How many aircraft has Colombia seized from the traffickers in 1985? Has the government used any of these planes for the eradication program? If not, why?

Answer: The National Police have seized 25 aircraft to date in 1985. The armed forces have seized about the same number. According to the Colombian civil aviation authorities [DAAC -- Departamento Administrativo de Aeronautica Civil], in the last three years the Colombian Government has seized 167 Colombian planes and in the last six years, they have seized 405 American planes. Most of these aircraft are unsafe or unsuitable for use in narcotics control. Trafficking aircraft often have hidden defects due to operations beyond safe limits and without adequate maintenance. Occupants usually flee with plane logs, which requires expensive overhaul to assure safe operation. Further, the small anti-narcotics fleet must be standardized on models and engines to keep the air operation within the capabilities of available manpower and budgetary resources. The National Police have incorporated into its fleet several seized aircraft which meet criteria.

13. What is your estimate of the value of the marijuana and coca crops to the Colombian economy? How much of that money do you estimate actually remains in Colombia?

Answer: Most recent academic research indicates that marijuana production and trade is about three percent of Colombia's GDP -- some USD 650 million -- and that of cocaine some one percent of GDP -- or USD 225 million. The corresponding GDP figure is USD 22 billion.

Drug money first became important in Colombia's external account balance about a decade ago when earnings from the burgeoning cocaine trade were added to the already substantial receipts from the marijuana business. Most research indicates that by the mid-1970's drug money flows were equivalent to at least 15 percent of all foreign exchange receipts. The annual drug money flow into Colombia peaked in 1980 at about USD 2 billion. The Government closed the Central Bank "Ventanilla Siniestra" in October 1982, and the inflow shrank to

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less than USD 1 billion in 1984. Traffickers' disinclination to return funds to Colombia was in part a result of Colombia's then deteriorating international financial situation. It also reflected the increased financial sophistication of traffickers, who began to hold more of their profits outside the country in dollars rather than spending them in Colombia to enhance their lifestyle and position in society, especially after the government's crackdown following the April 30, 1984 assassination of Justice Minister Rodingo Lara Bonilla.

14. Would you comment on the current investigation in Peru of allegations that high officials of the previous government were involved in drug trafficking?

Answer: In his July inaugural address, President Alan Garcia sharply attacked narcotics trafficking and pledged to wage a campaign against all types of corruption. Since that time the Interior Minister of Peru has dismissed 56 generals and 131 colonels from the Investigations Police and Civil Guard, as well as 40 other police officials. The police are to be reorganized and there are indications that there will be more dismissals. We are not aware of any formal accusations against any other high officials of the previous government.

15. The Washington Post recently reported that the U.S. is withholding narcotics aid to Peru because of U.S. dissatisfaction with Peru's stance on foreign policy issues, such as Central America. Peruvian officials continue to complain at the "low level" of narcotics aid they receive from the U.S.

a] Have the Peruvians requested additional U.S. narcotics control aid?

Answer: The Government of Peru has indicated an interest in an increase in the funding of the International Narcotics Control [INC] program.

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We are now exploring with that Government the resource requirements necessary to carry out eradication and enforcement programs.

b] Has the U.S. indicated it would not provide such aid for foreign policy related reasons, or for any other reasons?

Answer: The allegation published in the Washington Post is clearly mistaken. U.S. assistance to Peru to support narcotics control is not tied to that government's policies on other matters. Allocations of narcotics assistance are determined by the narcotics control objectives in a drug producing nation and on the opportunities for narcotics control success that the U.S. Government sees in that nation. While we have not been fully satisfied with the pace of coca eradication in Peru, the U.S. is very supportive of that nation's efforts, and is particularly cognizant of the opposition to those efforts, including massacres of coca eradication workers, and other violence which makes coca eradication very difficult. We have been very encouraged by the recent joint Colombian-Peruvian law enforcement activities and the expanded eradication/enforcement operation now taking place in the Upper Huallaga Valley. These actions have given new impetus to President Garcia's narcotics control efforts. All of these operations have had U.S. INC funding and DEA support and we look forward to continued cooperation with the Government of Peru in anti-narcotics endeavors.

c] If we were to provide planes to Peru, for what purpose would they use them since here is no aerial eradication program in Peru?

Answer: At the present time we do not have sufficient funds available to provide planes to Peru. If, however, the U.S. were to provide them for Peru's anti-narcotics operations, initially they would be aircraft which could be used for reconnaissance and police transport purposes. We are currently reimbursing the Peruvian Air Force for use of their helicopters in support of UMOPAR anti-narcotics operations in the Upper Huallaga Valley.

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16. Mr. Thomas, in your testimony before the Select Committee, you stated that "Broad agreement on the need to link economic assistance from the world community to progress on narcotics control, a goal which the Department of State shares with the Congress, is among the highest priority goals we bring to all of these discussions on the multilateral front."

a] What steps have we taken to encourage other donors to link economic aid to narcotics control performance?

b] Have any other countries actually imposed linkage?

c] If the Department supports such linkage, why has the Administration consistently opposed efforts by this and other committees to promote such linkage?*

17. As you know, I have expressed concern over a recent reprogramming of narcotics control funds to Mexico. Despite an inquiry to your Bureau, I have been unable to obtain information regarding the increased flying time by eradication planes which presumably prompted this reprogramming. I would like to insert in the record our exchange of correspondence on this issue, along with any information you can supply on this subject.

Answer: I believe that there has been an oversimplification of the requirement for increased FY 1985 maintenance funds in Mexico that resulted in the recent reprogramming. As you know, the Mexican Attorney General Office's [MAGO] air fleet consists of several types of aircraft used for support purposes as well as spray ships. Flight hours of the various aircraft vary with operational requirements, flying conditions, etc. Flying hours for the type currently in use as spray platforms in Mexico, Bell 206 helicopters, do show some increase in 1985 over comparable 1984 figures. For example, average flying hours per month over the last fiscal quarter [July - September] were up about 5 hours per month to approximately 65 hours per month. Neither this, however, nor usage rates of other aircraft types in the Mexico fleet is the primary reason for the FY 1985 funding increase.

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*At time of printing, responses to these questions had not been received.

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During fiscal 85, there were a total of 15 incidents involving Mexican program aircraft, due to a variety of causes ranging from pilot error to ground fire at spray aircraft. This rate of accidents is a significant increase from previous years, and of course was not anticipated in the original budget submission. Although the aircraft are covered by insurance, there is a "deductible" clause, and therefore increased maintenance funding required to repair accident damage. During 1985, we estimate that this produced a distortion of approximately USD 480,000 in the projected maintenance budget.

In addition, 11 new helicopters were added to the MAGO eradication fleet during 1985. The additional helicopters implied some increased costs in initial preparations for operations, as well as on-going operations maintenance. We calculate the 1985 costs associated with these aircraft at approximately USD 330,000. Adjustments to spare parts procurement schedules and other procedural changes have permitted con- tinuance of full eradication operations without a reprogramming of an amount in excess of USD 800,000 as would be suggested by these figures.

I must add that we are very concerned about questions of flight safety as well as on-going routine maintenance of the MAGO aircraft fleet. Reflecting this concern, we have added three contract positions to our staff in Mexico over the past few months, including an aviation advisor, a flight safety advisor, and a computer expert. The latter individual is enabling us to begin new programs of computerization to monitor maintenance and parts inventory systems, and general data analysis. The aviation and flight safety advisors are helping to investigate causes of aircraft accidents, including identifying culpability and implementing corrective action as required. I would note that the Attorney General's office has released several pilots over the past few months because they were judged not fit for duty.

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18. There have been some reports that the Administration is considering reprogramming aid to one or more of the Andean countries. Would you favor an increase in aid to any country which had failed to take adequate steps to meet its narcotics control obligations?

Answer: I would prefer not to answer this hypothetical question. We will probably need to do some re-programming in 1986. I would not favor additional funds to any program unless I was convinced that such funds would serve the interests of improved narcotics control.

19. Ecuador has become a major producer of coca, yet the FY 1986 request for narcotics control assistance is lower than expenditures in FY 1985. Nor has the Department assigned a narcotics control officer to Ecuador. Chairman Fascell and I wrote you to urge an expeditious grant to Ecuador. What is the current status of this program?

Answer: The U.S. suspended narcotics control assistance to Ecuador in 1983 because of inefficiency and corruption in the police. In September of 1984, after the inauguration of the new president, we resumed limited operational support to Ecuador for coca eradication, with USD 50,000 granted in FY84 and USD 450,000 this past fiscal year. All these funds were re-programmed from other accounts, since there was no specific provision for Ecuador. The request for the current year, USD 300,000, was prepared in 1984. Given the changed circumstances we expect to spend much more than this in Ecuador this year. We expect to name a narcotics control officer to the Embassy in Quito in the first half of next year.

20. What is the status of negotiations between the U.S. and the Bahamas on a mutual legal assistance treaty? These negotiations have been going on for some time -- is there a prospect for their favorable conclusion?

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Answer: I am pleased to say that in recent months there has been considerable progress towards agreement with the Government of the Bahamas for a text of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. We anticipate that a text can be initialed by both governments soon, and shortly thereafter signed.

21. Reportedly, the Administration has stepped up its efforts to establish legal assistance agreements with bank secrecy countries. How is this effort proceeding? And what is the status of negotiation with the Cayman Islands?

Answer: The U.S. entered into an drug agreement with U.K. government on behalf of the Cayman Islands on August 29, 1984. By its terms, this initial agreement was due to expire on November 29, 1985; the U.S. and the U.K. exchanged notes on November 29 extending the agreement until May 29, 1986. The U.S. and the U.K., including Cayman, held negotiations from November 13 - 15 on a draft treaty on mutual legal assistance. Very good progress was made during these discussions, and we anticipate a follow-up session in January, 1986. I have previously noted the excellent progress we have made in discussions regarding a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the Government of the Bahamas. I would also affirm that we are actively pursuing discussions with countries throughout the Caribbean basin area whose bank secrecy laws are of primary concern to us.

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